

R-1665-ARPA
October 1975

A Biographical Approach to Chinese Political Analysis

George C. S. Sung

A Report prepared for
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

The research described in this Report was sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under contract No. DAHC15-73-C-0181. Reports of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

R-1665-ARPA
October 1975

A Biographical Approach to Chinese Political Analysis

George C. S. Sung

A Report prepared for
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY



PREFACE

This Report was prepared as part of Rand's continuing research program, under the sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, on various aspects of political and military developments in the People's Republic of China. It describes an attempt to provide alternative ways of identifying and explaining Chinese leadership changes using computer-assisted biographic analysis to supplement qualitative analysis and judgments.

The Report is related to an earlier study by W. W. Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1091-DOS/ARPA, June 1973.

The scarcity of data remains the constant problem of China research. To confront this problem requires not only the search for data and its processing, but also innovative research strategies to make maximum use of what data are available. The methodology, hypotheses, and conclusions of this Report should be of interest to political and biographic analysts in the national intelligence community involved in studying China.

SUMMARY

The study provides a novel methodological basis for a computer-assisted biographic analysis of the Chinese leadership. It attempts to exploit biographic data, focusing on 484 senior Chinese leaders whose background and careers from 1956 to September 1973 should provide indicators of mutual antagonism or agreement as the basis for elite interest-group behavior. The major analytical tasks so far undertaken are: (1) to identify background variables that affect elite group relationships, (2) to trace the changes in the distribution of power among these elite groups, (3) to attempt to explain these changes in terms of contemporaneous political events, and (4) to explore the validity and predictive value of the approach.

The study has attempted to develop alternative ways of identifying and explaining personnel mobility, in the hope that the resulting patterns of mobility will help us understand better how China might move from where it is now to where it may be in the future. A major, though still tentative, conclusion of the study is that changes in personnel assignments can indeed be taken as indicators of political turning points and of changes in power relationships at the center of power. Although all of the biographic data manipulations are done by computer, the program and the computer work have been deliberately designed to be analysis-intensive rather than machine-intensive, so that the manipulations would yield a maximum of substantive insight. In sum, the study attempts to develop a systematic method of confirming prevailing assumptions about China and exploiting insights about its political system.

Four main hypotheses are suggested to develop indicators of decisive political turning points, signals of interfactional mobility, methods of assessing regime characteristics, and ways of examining career patterns. Under the broad hypothesis covering political indicators of political crisis, we suggest that personnel continuity exists in the *core* provinces, where military-region headquarters are located. In addition to having lower personnel turnover, core provinces tend

to have stronger factional cohesion (fewer *outsiders*) than the weaker, *marginal* provinces. Consequently, a leadership struggle for political positions is likely to occur first in the marginal provinces and then move to the core provinces and finally the national level. An increase of military representation in the top leadership can be another indicator of domestic political crisis. Whether military intervention in the political situation is motivated by desire for power, or is based on the conviction that such intervention is essential for maintaining law and order, the shift in status between civil and military cadres will point to some shift in national priority and even indicate the status of economic development and social stability.

In terms of interfactional mobility, we presume that if leaders sharing the same background have collectively received promotions or demotions, we may tentatively conclude that these indicators have some utility for understanding China's internal political conflict. Background variables are examined -- each independently -- to determine the mobility of the leaders who share the same background and loyalties. If distributions of promotions and demotions among different generations, for example, reveal different behavior patterns, and if these patterns can be verified by historical events, then these background variables can become useful indicators of group behavior.

We assume in assessing regime characteristics that changing proportions of interest-group representation may indicate predictable changes in Chinese policies and priorities. The emergence of a technical managerial stratum of political leaders might be reflected in the increasing appointment of professional, better educated, younger generations and personnel affiliated with the industrially richer military regions. Manipulation of biographic data can thus become an indicator of dynamic changes in national and regional priorities over time.

We examine the career patterns of a group of Chinese leaders to learn the distribution of those who have had a single promotion or demotion, several promotions or demotions, mixed promotions and demotions, and neither promotion nor demotion during their careers. These career patterns may reveal the degree of political vulnerability imposed by demotion. For example, do single demotions or even purges destroy

political careers? If not, what type of demotion or how many demotions does it take to destroy a career? Can the rehabilitation of purged cadres reveal the state of China's political system? Career mobility is also worth examining. How do individual leaders move upward or downward? Do interactions exist between the Center and the local level in which promoted personnel tend to move from local positions to positions in Peking? Do interactions exist among different military regions in which promotions or demotions take place across different regional units? Can the data, which cover eighteen years, show that some positions tend to be advantageous while others are disadvantageous?

These hypotheses are empirically tested and the major findings are summarized as follows:

- o A relatively high purge rate is related to crisis events and decisive domestic political turning points. Therefore, a high purge rate (1 percent in this study) should be a cue to focus attention on possible changes in course and the nature of the change.
- o Since the Cultural Revolution, there has been a two-year lag between the peak of purges and the peak of new appointments. It seems to take about two years of consolidation among the competing factions before they can agree to settle on appointments. This suggests that the purge process does not eradicate factionalism, i.e., competing factions continue to exist, and a lengthy process of bargaining and maneuver is essential before vacant positions can be filled.
- o Since 1964, purges and demotions in the marginal provinces appear to have occurred before purges and demotions in the core provinces. Thus, personnel discontinuity in the marginal provinces may be the precursor of personnel turnover in the core provinces and at the national level.
- o Civilians and military officers have risen and fallen as groups since 1956 in phase with major changes in

policy and line. This suggests that changes in the relative positions of these two major groups can become an indicator of a political turning point.

- o The Cultural Revolution disrupted the relatively stable personnel continuity in China; subsequent personnel shifts reveal that leaders sharing the same background (particularly of generation, civilian or military, field-army, and military-region affiliation) have collectively received promotions or demotions.
- o Long-term affiliations, such as with a field army, appear to be a significant factor identifying the competing factions and their interfactional mobility. However, the substantial increase in the number of leaders whose field-army affiliations are not known may indicate an increasing number who do not have such affiliations and, consequently, a decline of field-army ties among the newly emerging elite.
- o The data underscore the relative power of insiders in military regions and the stagnation of career mobility within the military regions. This suggests the existence and importance of military-region factions.
- o The increasing representation of military regions in the top leadership also suggests that more power is now exercised at the regional level than was exercised in the period immediately following the Communist accession to power in 1949. The Nanking, Canton, Peking, and Shenyang military regions should receive special attention.
- o The lack of different patterns between the commanders and the commissars in terms of collective promotion and demotion can be used to argue that the conflict between command and political personnel in the armed forces is not as sharp as some analysts imply. Perhaps these two groups are influenced more by other factors, including

the field-army and military-region affiliation, than by the competition with each other.

- o The changing regime characteristics may reflect the changing proportions of interest groups (or factions) in the top leadership group. Thus, changing ratios of field-army affiliations, military-region affiliations, insiders and outsiders, generations, civilian and military cadres, commanders and commissars, Korean War participants, and affiliations by function can be used to assess the state of the political system. For example, corroborating the evidence of increasing representation of Korean War participants, the rising representation of military managers might suggest a trend toward professionalism. However, the steady (i.e., not increasing) representation of the military technocrats suggests a predisposition to limit rapid developments of technical modernization in most conventional weapons fields. The Air Force was an exception to this pattern, gaining steadily in representation between 1956 and 1970. This gain and the subsequent decline in 1973 may reflect the close Air Force tie with Lin Piao.
- o The Second and Third field armies not only had a high rate of promotion, but as a group also gained increased representation in the top leadership in 1973. The Fourth Field Army obviously lost its status as the dominant field-army group following the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. Thus, the senior leaders of the Second and Third field armies should be closely observed and analyzed.
- o Demotion is not fatal to a political career in the Chinese political system. Even officials who are purged or who disappear sometimes have the opportunity to return to power. However, when an official suffers two consecutive demotions without being promoted, his political career seems to end.
- o Rehabilitation can become an indicator of the state of the political system. Most of the twenty-two officials rehabilitated between 1956 and 1973 came back following the

fall of Lin Piao. The rehabilitation indicates the priority given to the return to civilian rule, with experienced older cadres apparently in greater demand than the young.

- o In terms of career mobility, the overall data under study show little interaction between the Center and the local level. Downward mobility from the Center to the local level is rarer than upward mobility from the local level to the Center.
- o Mobility within a military region or a province is the predominant pattern; mobility between military regions is limited, with most leaders spending their entire career in the same military region.
- o Few promotions represent movement from lower-rank positions to higher-rank positions, and few demotions represent downward movement. Rather, judging from the limited data set of this study, promotion represents appointment to additional positions, and demotion is the equivalent of dismissal, purge, or disappearance from the Chinese leadership. This suggests that the older, veteran cadres tend to monopolize senior positions, a situation likely to create frustration and even lack of commitment and enthusiasm among their subordinates denied opportunity.

In the follow-on research, several key questions need to be addressed: Which background variables best predict what sets of elite attitudes under what conditions? Which of the variables are the most relevant and reliable attitudinal indicators? What additions or refinements in these indicators should be made? Are these additions or refinements researchable within the existing framework? How might the framework be improved? Can we identify consistent leads or lags between central directives and the implementation of these directives in different regions and provinces? Analytic work on these and other questions can bring us much closer to a validation of the approach as a policy-relevant research tool.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the early stages of this research, I worked in conjunction with W. W. Whitson. Many of his thoughtful contributions have been retained in this study, and I am pleased to record here my indebtedness for them. I also owe a debt of gratitude to many Rand colleagues, particularly to D. J. Armor, S. T. Hosmer, Hans Heymann, Jr., J. C. Graham, and R. Y. Pei, as well as to Parris Chang, a Rand consultant, all of whom generously read and constructively criticized early drafts of this study.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xi
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BIOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES, POLITICAL INDICATORS, AND HYPOTHESES: A RESEARCH DESIGN	6
A. Biographical Indicators and Criteria	6
B. Conceptual Refinements and Problems	14
C. Population	19
D. Research Model	22
E. Indicators of Domestic Political Turning Points	24
F. Hypotheses on Interfactional Mobility	27
G. Hypotheses on Assessing Regime Characteristics	29
H. Career Patterns	31
I. Conclusion	32
III. INDICATORS OF DECISIVE POLITICAL TURNING POINTS	33
A. Purge as an Indicator of Political Crisis	33
B. Ascendancy of the Military as an Indicator of Crisis	37
C. Personnel Shifts in Marginal Provinces as an Indicator of Political Change	39
IV. INDICATORS OF INTERFACTION MOBILITY	43
A. Method of Statistical Analysis	44
B. Field-Army Affiliation	45
C. Generational Differences	49
D. Civilian-Military Conflict	53
E. Commanders Versus Commissars	57
F. Military-Region Affiliation	60
G. Functional Interest Groups	62
V. ASSESSING REGIME CHARACTERISTICS	65
A. Distribution of Field-Army Representatives	66
B. Distribution of Military-Region Representatives	69
C. Distribution of Generations	71
D. Distribution of Civilian and Military Personnel	73
E. Distribution of Korean War Participants	74
F. Distribution of Leaders by Function	76
G. Summary of Regime Characteristics and Trends in the 1970s	78

VI. CAREER PATTERNS	82
A. Six Career Types Based on Promotions and Demotions	82
B. Purged and Rehabilitated Personnel	83
C. Mobility Patterns	85
VII. CONCLUSIONS	96
NOTES	101
Appendix	
1. List of Leaders Used in This Study	105
2. Distribution of Leaders by Field-Army Affiliation, 1956-1973	110
3. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution by Field Army, 1956-1973	111
4. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution by Field Army, 1956-1973	112
5. Distribution of Leaders by Generation, 1956-1973	113
6. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution by Generation, 1956-1973	114
7. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution by Generation 1956-1973	115
8. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution for Civilian vs. Military Leaders, 1956-1973	116
9. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution for Civilian vs. Military Leaders, 1956-1973	117
10. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution for Commissars vs. Commanders, 1956-1973	118
11. Actual, Expected, and Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution for Commissars vs. Commanders, 1956-1973	119
12. Distribution of Leaders By Function, 1956-1973	120
13. Distribution of Actual Promotions by Function, 1956-1973 ...	121
14. Distribution of Expected Promotions by Function, 1956-1973	122
15. Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution by Function, 1956-1973	123
16. Distribution of Actual Demotions by Function, 1956-1973	124
17. Distribution of Expected Demotions by Function, 1956-1973	125
18. Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution by Function, 1956-1973	126
19. Major Computer Programs Used in This Study	127
20. Biographic Sources	129
21. Bibliography	131

FIGURES

1. Data Layout for Computer Cards	10
2. The Evolution of Field Armies Since 1927	15
3. Promotions in the Military Hierarchy	21
4. Promotions in the Party Hierarchy	22
5. Promotions in the Government Hierarchy	23
6. Foci of Research on PRC Leadership	25
7. Ratio of Purges and Appointments, 1956-1973	36
8. Demotion Ratio in Selected Core and Marginal Provinces, 1957-1973	41
9. Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution, by Field Army	46
10. Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution, by Field Army	47
11. Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution, by Generation	50
12. Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution, by Generation	51
13. Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution for Civilian vs. Military Leaders	54
14. Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution for Civilian vs. Military Leaders	55
15. Deviation of Actual from Expected Promotion Distribution for Commissars vs. Commanders	58
16. Deviation of Actual from Expected Demotion Distribution for Commissars vs. Commanders	59

TABLES

1. Purges and Appointments of Officials, 1957-1973	35
2. Civilian/Military Distribution of Leadership by Year, 1956-1973	38
3. Demotions by Selected Core and Marginal Provinces	40
4. Insider/Outsider Promotions and Demotions by Military Region, 1956-1973	61
5. Distribution of Leaders by Field-Army Affiliation, 1956-1973	67
6. Distribution of Leaders by Military-Region Affiliation, 1956-1973	70
7. Distribution of Leaders by Generation, 1956-1973	72
8. Distribution of Civilian vs. Military Leaders, 1956-1973	74
9. Distribution of Korean War Participants Among Leadership, 1956-1973	75
10. Distribution of Leaders by Function, 1956-1973	77
11. Six Career Types Based on Promotions and Demotions, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	83
12. Elite Career Mobility by Military Region and Promotion and Demotion, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	87
13. Elite Career Mobility with Multiple Promotions by Location of Position and by Institution, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	89
14. Elite Career Mobility with Single Promotions by Location of Position and by Institution, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	91
15. Elite Career Mobility with Single Demotions by Location of Position and by Institution, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	92
16. Elite Career Mobility with Mixed Promotions and Demotions by Location of Position and by Institution, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	94
17. Officials with Mixed Promotions and Demotions by Level and Number of Positions, 1956-1965 and 1966-1973	95

I. INTRODUCTION

The scarcity of data remains the constant problem of research on the People's Republic of China (PRC). To confront this problem requires not only the search for data and its processing, but also more innovative research strategies to make maximum use of what data are available. It is essential, therefore, to develop raw data and methodological tools that can contribute to effective understanding of the PRC's political system, or even to confirming prevailing intuitive assumptions about China. Such understanding will eventually reduce uncertainty in projecting Chinese political behavior. And minimizing uncertainty constitutes an essence of rational projection.

The promise and limitations of biographic analysis remain controversial despite a general consensus among social scientists that the power elite of a country plays a crucial role in the political system. One of the most controversial yet intriguing issues is the relationship between the biographical variables of elites and the broad spectrum of their political behavior. Analytic work on these interrelationships can bring us much closer to a recognition of elite studies as a policy-relevant research tool.

Many methods of elite analysis exist.* It is argued that at the macropolitical level such sociological variables as nationality, education, and generational groupings are good indicators of an elite's basic values and interest orientations in social and political conflicts. At the micropolitical level, one can take into account more detailed variables, such as Party affiliation, career patterns, and organizational experiences, which appear to be useful indicators of general political attitudes, responses to crisis situations, and decisionmaking processes. By exploring these two broad approaches, elite analysis is helpful in explaining long-term trends of leadership and organizational orientations.

Another approach to biographic analysis is to examine the characteristics of different elite groups, such as the political elite at

* A selected bibliography of elite studies is listed in Appendix 21.

the national level (for example, the membership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), or at the subnational level (for example, the provincial leadership). Elites in the functional areas, such as military or foreign affairs, deserve special attention because of their relationship to the institutional and bureaucratic cleavages within a political system. Such factors as military-political rivalries in military institutions might be good indicators of policy preferences and budgetary allocations.

That no single biographic model can fully explain all aspects of elite political behavior is generally accepted. Few studies, however, have proceeded from the assumption that different approaches, or a combination of approaches, is more valuable. Thus, a major task of biographic analysis is to develop a number of specific, interrelated theories and hypotheses that will provide the potential for revising some conceptual approaches of the past and structuring new ones. This study approaches the task by examining sociological variables, career variables, organizational experiences, and political elites at the national level as well as at the subnational level. Four broad hypotheses are empirically examined (Sections III-VI) and attempts are made to interrelate these hypotheses. The interrelationships will suggest that changes in personnel assignments can be taken as indicators of political turning points and of changes in power relationships at the core.

A large and rich data set with a number of variables, arranged empirically for maximum flexibility, is another distinctive feature of this study. The research would be aimed at developing the kind of computerized biographic information system that would be capable of storing, retrieving, augmenting and revising a potentially large fund of biographic data, and that could be used effectively as a vehicle for discovering and testing linkages between personnel changes and shifts in national policies. This Report is a first step toward this far-reaching goal.

Therefore, while all the manipulations of the elite data are done by computer, the program and the computer work have been deliberately designed to be analysis-intensive rather than machine-intensive, so that the manipulations would yield a maximum of substantive insight. Few

Chinese biographic studies have applied the computer extensively or successfully to analyze and manipulate large amounts of complicated data.

When systematic empirical research on Chinese leaders' statements, policy attitudes, and behavior is severely hindered by lack of data, personnel changes in China and their background data, which are relatively abundant, may be adequate for significant research findings. The utility of background variables, the set of concepts, and the data manipulations used in this research aim not only at classifying and describing elite groups, but also at understanding, explaining, and projecting the intergroup dynamics of the political process. The major analytical tasks are to (1) pinpoint fundamental background variables and indicate basic relationships, (2) describe and explain the behavior of elite groups, (3) explain how patterns of power distribution and elite relationships change and new patterns emerge, and (4) in the future, project policy trends.

It is believed possible, by examining career data common to key personnel, to identify contending interest groups in the Chinese leadership. *Personnel* changes in the Chinese high command are likely to be leading indicators of *policy* changes.^{1*} This should be true for at least three good reasons:

First, personnel changes often reflect and identify which group or groups control personnel assignments.

Second, elite interest groups share certain values and goals. By examining group behavior, we can obtain a useful indication of group policy preferences and likely behavior, depending upon intergroup balance of power, at different stages of the political process.

Third, evidence of changes in the backgrounds and attitudes of key leaders over time is a good gauge of trends occurring or likely to occur within the system.²

Although explicit linkages between such political indicators, on the one hand, and Chinese policy preferences and policy trends on the other are not a part of this study, our methodological thinking has taken them into serious consideration.

* For Notes to the text, see pages 101-103.

The present study accents the human resources, focusing on 484 Chinese political and military leaders, whose background and careers should provide indicators of mutual antagonism or agreement as the basis for interest-group behavior. An *elite interest group* is a group of leaders whose collective behavior is influenced primarily by certain shared background, affiliations, and interests. It is important to note, however, that an elite interest group does not necessarily have a formalized organizational structure. Indeed, its members may be leaders of different organizations and yet be so deeply influenced by common interests and goals as to respond collectively to crisis. An interest group is thus presumed to be impelled by a corporate loyalty to shared values and goals.

Some conceptual questions will broadly set the research dimensions. What biographical variables are most useful in developing such political indicators as factions, factional mobility, domestic political turning points, and changing regime characteristics? What specific data are available to support systematic generalization? What kinds of analytical techniques are most appropriate for use with the available data?³ Specifically, we want to know: Who holds power? How can we explain internal leadership changes at the national and subnational levels? Who has what access to what power, where in the organizational structure, in which stage of organizational life, and over whom? What indicators of important political changes affecting military and political dispositions can be inferred from the behavior pattern and background? Or, which background variables are good indicators of important political changes affecting military and political dispositions? In other words, how can (or do) the biographical analyses develop meaningful indexes for more accurate observations and projections of Chinese personnel behavior, domestic political developments, and changing regime characteristics?

One approach of this study is to think from the outset in terms of alternative ways of identifying and explaining personnel mobility, and, perhaps most important, to try to identify the contingencies that will help us understand how China might move from where it is now to where it may be in the near future. The emphasis on personnel analysis does not indicate a denial of the significant impact of the

external environment and domestic situation on China's political process. But we argue that larger personnel patterns can also be a kind of indicator that give us some sense of power relationships at the core. The author has tried to develop a methodology that is suggestive and explorative in nature, and intended to provoke more questions and research, so that biographical analysis can indeed become a predictive political indicator.

A second approach of this study is to apply quantification and quantitative analysis of biographic information to supplement the qualitative analysis and judgments. For this reason, all data manipulations for the study have been done by computer. The computer can be an invaluable tool for analyzing large quantities of data and manipulating complicated rearrangements of data, if the data are properly structured and the "bugs" have been worked out of the computer program. Section II discusses the specific data structure and methodology for this study. Several hypotheses are listed showing the manipulation of biographic variables in order to test some assumptions.

Section III treats these assumptions, the first of which concerns indicators of domestic political turning points. An attempt is made to develop personnel shifts into indicators capable of providing some advanced warning of changes in the pattern of domestic political development. Section IV seeks to identify indicators of political conflict and interfactional mobility derived from promotions and demotions among the 484 civil and military leaders included in this study. Section V discusses the assessment of regime characteristics on the basis of the changing distribution of power among the contending groups. Finally, Section VI is devoted to the examination of career patterns of these 484 officials during two periods: from 1956 to 1965, before the Cultural Revolution; and from 1966 to 1973, after the Cultural Revolution. Section VII presents conclusions, based on the tentative inferences from the findings, about (1) the utility of biographical analysis, (2) the utility of computer application in the data manipulation, and (3) future research whereby behavior patterns of Chinese political conflict might be further clarified.

II. BIOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES, POLITICAL INDICATORS, AND HYPOTHESES:

A RESEARCH DESIGN

This section develops a framework of conceptual and operational measures for manipulating and interpreting data for the purpose of analyzing the interrelationship of biographical background and political indicators to achieve a more effective understanding of Chinese politics. A few hypotheses are listed to set the broad dimensions of our research. The model and hypotheses are examined empirically in sections III through VI.

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INDICATORS AND CRITERIA

The major biographical criteria on which we have based our analysis are: (1) generation (based on the date of entry into the Army or the Party) to which a particular leader belongs; (2) whether he is a civilian (Party and/or government) official or a military officer; (3) the field army or armies with which he has been affiliated; (4) the military region or regions with which he has been affiliated; (5) whether he is (or has been) a commander or a commissar -- that is, whether his orientation is primarily military or political -- or both; (6) the functional interest group, such as military service arm or government agency, with which he is associated. These criteria were selected because they are relatively specific; data relating to them are available; and these data are factual and require minimal judgment on the part of the analyst.

Other biographic criteria that could be used as indicators of elite group behavior to measure political conflict in China proved less fruitful.⁴ First of all, there are gaps in the data available on such potential indicators as level of education, exposure to Soviet influence and training, personal affiliation, and adherence to one of two opposing ideological lines (Maoist versus Liuist, radical versus conservative, rightist versus leftist, modernist versus traditionalist, technocrat versus bureaucrat, expert versus "Red" or ideologue, and so on). A second problem is that data having to do with attitudes or abstractions (ideological lines) tend to be ambiguous and open to different

interpretations to the extent to which they rely on the analyst's intuition or judgment. For example, exposure to Soviet training and participation in the Korean War suggest the possibility of Soviet influence on administrative and military style, but this information is not conclusive. Or, data concerning adherence to one of two broad ideological lines usually relate to attitudinal patterns and abstractions that are subject to widely different interpretations. Data on career, generational affiliation, and educational background also suggest possible attitudinal patterns on ideological questions (the Red-versus-expert controversy, the mass line versus Party discipline, etc.), and may indeed reinforce other data, but again the analyst must interpret the evidence.

On the other hand, data that reveal loyalty to organizations -- and possibly to personalities -- are more persuasive because they depend less on intuition and analytical judgment, and their meaning is less ambiguous. To the extent that an individual has spent most of his career in a particular field army or military region, spent his professional years in a single province, has followed either a civil or a military career, or has been affiliated with a particular ministry or military service, we may make tentative judgments about his *institutional* loyalties -- that is, not to an ambiguous abstraction, but to a collection of people whose sense of in-group identity may be historical-institutional (pre-1954), geographic, or bureaucratic (post-1954). The same kind of data may point to *personal* loyalties that could either diminish or reinforce institutional obligations. Likewise, data on Korean War service, and also on generational and personal (family) affiliations, might be evidence of close ties with particular senior leaders.⁵ Chinese Nationalist and Red Guard analyses during the Cultural Revolution both indicate that the Chinese regard personal ties to be highly significant in politics. Such analysis must, however, be based on such precise judgments of an individual's priority of loyalties that judgments and analyses alike become highly suspect. This study has sought to present a less personalized assessment, one that does not rely on but might be reinforced by evidence of personal loyalties.

Geographic locus adds another dimension to institutional and personal loyalties. Because of relatively stable elite distribution among military regions since 1954, data on both field-army and military-regional affiliation provide mutually reinforcing historical evidence of loyalties to local institutions and to the leaders of these institutions, that is, to a geographic power base. Provincial origin and family affiliation may reinforce such evidence. Other factors, such as long-term occupancy of the same Party or military position, cut across loyalties to suggest either a central or a broadly national affiliation, because many leaders in Peking or in other parts of the country share the same experience. (Examples of the latter category are exposure to Soviet education or advisers; Korean War participation; adherence to an ideological line; career affiliation with one ministry or military service; career function; educational level; and generational affiliation.) As a general principle, evidence pointing to either a central or a nationally based interest group must be considered as overriding any factors that suggest local interest groups. That is, if what appears to be a dominant local interest group fails to prove its dominance in the shifting of human and material resources, we may hypothesize the intervention of more broadly based interest groups with a greater commitment to the common (as against the local) good.

Obviously, it is desirable to have background variables that are rich in policy implications. Some background characteristics are more relevant to elite group attitudes, and some attitudes are more strongly related than others to background characteristics in a particular political system. Empirical research on political elites generally demonstrates that career variables are often significant in describing changes in the composition of leadership groups and in explaining variations in values and attitudes.⁶ For our purposes, background variables should show shared experience, shared interests, or shared goals on the basis of which a group of leaders could be expected to behave (with variable depth of loyalty or commitment) as a collectivity, a faction, or an interest group. Let us then examine personnel shifts from 1956 to 1973 primarily in terms of criteria for which the data (1) are available and relatively specific; (2) suggest loyalty primarily to

an institution and secondarily to a personality; (3) are suggestive of local loyalties; and (4) have long-term significance for interest-group behavior.

We selected the biographic variables for analysis on the basis of the criteria discussed above. There are six computer data cards for each of the 484 leaders included in the study. Each leader was assigned an identification number (an alphabetical listing of the 484 leaders, together with identification number, is given in Appendix 1). The subject's identification number appears on each of the six cards (his name appears only on the first card). Where a leader is affiliated at more than one level -- e.g., Center, military region (MR), and military district (MD) -- the lowest level is identified. Following is a list of the seventeen information categories coded for each leader. The data layout for the computer cards is shown in Fig. 1; the numbers in parentheses on the data cards correspond to the seventeen categories listed below.

Card 1

1. Name
2. Date of death
3. Date of birth
4. Place of birth

1 = Anhwei, 2 = Chekiang, 3 = Fukien, 4 = Heilungkiang,
 5 = Honan, 6 = Hopeh, 7 = Hunan, 8 = Hupeh, 9 = Inner
 Mongolia, 10 = Kansu, 11 = Kiangsi, 12 = Kiangsu, 13 = Kirin,
 14 = Kwangsi, 15 = Kwangtung, 16 = Kweichow, 17 = Liaoning,
 18 = Ninghsia, 19 = Peking, 20 = Shanghai, 21 = Shansi,
 22 = Shantung, 23 = Shensi, 24 = Sinkiang, 25 = Szechwan,
 26 = Tibet, 27 = Tientsin, 28 = Tsinghai, 29 = Yunnan,
 30 = Taiwan

5. Generation *

G1 = Pre-May 1928, G2 = June 1928-November 1931, G3 =
 December 1931-December 1936, G4 = January 1937-December
 1940, G5 = January 1941-August 1945, G6 = September 1945-
 October 1950, G7 = November 1950-September 1954, G8 =

* Generation affiliation is determined by the date of entry into the Army for military personnel, or into the CCP for civilians. The period of each of the twelve generations represents more or less a cycle of crisis in the history of the CCP and the Red Army.⁷

October 1954-September 1959, G9 = October 1959-December 1963, G10 = January 1964-January 1967, G11 = February 1967-March 1969, G12 = April 1969-September 1973, FE = Final Estimate

6. Field-army (FA) affiliation by generation*
1 = 1st FA, 2 = 2d FA, 3 = 3d FA, 4 = 4th FA, 5 = North China FA, 6 = the Center
 7. Commander (cdr) or commissar (csr) by generation
1 = commissar, 2 = commander, 3 = both
 8. Date entered Party
 9. Military or civilian
1 = civilian, 2 = military
 10. Combat experience
1 = Korea (1950-1953), 2 = Taiwan Straits (1955, 1958, 1962),
3 = Sino-Indian border (1962), 4 = North Vietnam (1965-1971),
5 = Sino-Soviet border (1965-)
 11. Awards
1 = August 1 medal, 2 = Independent Liberty medal, 3 = Liberation medal
- Card 2
12. Civilian education
1 = grade school, 2 = high school, 3 = college, 4 = study in USSR, 5 = study in Germany, 6 = study in Japan, 7 = study in France
 13. Military education
1 = basic school, 2 = anti-Japanese college, 3 = Nanking Staff College, 4 = Peking War College, 5 = Soviet advisers (including study in Soviet military schools)
 14. Military-region affiliation by generation
1 = Sinkiang, 2 = Kunming, 3 = Nanking, 4 = Canton, 5 = Peking, 6 = Ch'engtu, 7 = Fuchou, 8 = Lanchou, 9 = Shenyang, 10 = Tsinan, 11 = Wuhan, 12 = Center
 15. Functional affiliation by generation
1 = Armor, 2 = Artillery, 3 = Engineers, 4 = Infantry, 5 = Signal Corps, 6 = Railway Corps, 7 = General Political Department, 8 = 2d Artillery (Missiles), 9 = Public Security Force, 10 = Air Force, 11 = Navy, 12 = General

* Field-army affiliation, commander or commissar, military-region affiliation, and functional affiliation are date coded according to the generation period in which they occurred.

Chief of Staff, 13 = General Rear Service, 14 = Propaganda and Education (including ministries: Culture, Education, Higher Education, Internal Affairs, Public Health), 15 = Industry and Communication (Building Construction, Building Materials, Chemical Industry, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Machinebuilding, Fuel & Chemical Industry, Communication, Geology, Light Industry, Textile, Metallurgical Industry, Petroleum Industry, Post and Telecommunication, Railway, Water Conservation, Allocation of Materials), 16 = Finance and Trade (Commerce, Finance, Food, Foreign Trade, Economic with Foreign Countries, Planning Commission), 17 = Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs), 18 = Agriculture and Forestry (Agriculture, Forestry, Aquatic Products, Labor, State Farm and Land Reclamation), 19 = Political and Legal, 20 = Organization and Personnel

Cards 3 to 5

16. Position level or rank, by year (1956-1973)

Military (M)

4 = National level

- 41 = Chairman, Military Affairs Committee (MAC)
- 42 = Vice Chairman, Military Affairs Committee
- 43 = Defense Minister
- 44 = Vice Defense Minister
- 45 = Chief of service arm
- 46 = Deputy Chief of service arm
- 47 = Political Commissar (PC) of service arm
- 48 = Deputy Political Commissar of service arm
- 40 = Unidentified position

3 = Regional level

- 31 = Commander of military region
- 32 = Political Commissar of military region
- 33 = Deputy Commander of military region
- 34 = Deputy Political Commissar of military region
- 35 = Chief of Staff of military region
- 30 = Unidentified position

2 = District level

- 21 = Commander of military district
- 22 = Political Commissar of military district
- 23 = Deputy Commander of military district
- 24 = Deputy Political Commissar of military district

Party (P)

4 = National level

- 41 = Politburo member
- 42 = Politburo alternate member
- 43 = Full member of Central Committee
- 44 = Alternate member of Central Committee

3 = Regional level

- 31 = 1st Secretary
- 32 = Secretary

2 = Provincial level

- 21 = 1st Secretary
- 22 = 2d Secretary
- 23 = Secretary
- 24 = Deputy Secretary
- 25 = Standing member

Government (G)

4 = National level

- 41 = Chief and Deputy Chief of State
- 42 = Premier
- 43 = Vice Premier
- 44 = Minister
- 45 = Vice Minister
- 46 = Director

2 = Provincial level

- 21 = Governor (Chairman, Revolutionary Committee)
- 22 = Vice Governor (Vice Chairman, Revolutionary Committee)
- 23 = Standing member, Revolutionary Committee

98 = Dismissed and purged

99 = Disappeared and attacked

Card 6

17. Province or military-region affiliation, by year

- 1 = Anhwei, 2 = Chekiang, 3 = Fukien, 4 = Heilungkiang,
- 5 = Honan, 6 = Hopeh, 7 = Hunan, 8 = Hupeh, 9 = Inner Mongolia,
- 10 = Kansu, 11 = Kiangsi, 12 = Kiangsu, 13 = Kirin,
- 14 = Kwangsi, 15 = Kwangtung, 16 = Kweichow, 17 = Liaoning,
- 18 = Ninghsia, 19 = Peking, 20 = Shanghai,
- 21 = Shansi, 22 = Shantung, 23 = Shensi, 24 = Sinkiang,
- 25 = Szechwan, 26 = Tibet, 27 = Tientsin, 28 = Tsinghai,
- 29 = Yunnan
- 30 = Center MR, 31 = Sinkiang MR (including 24), 32 = Kunming MR (including 16, 29),
- 33 = Nanking MR (including 1, 2, 11, 20), 34 = Canton MR (including 16, 15, 7),
- 35 = Peking MR (including 6, 9, 21, 19), 36 = Ch'engtu MR (including 25, 26),
- 37 = Fuchow MR (including 3, 11), 38 = Lanchow MR (including 10, 18, 23, 28),
- 39 = Shenyang MR (including 4, 13, 17), 40 = Tsinan MR (including 22, 27),
- 41 = Wuhan MR (including 5, 8).

B. CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

To develop and employ a computer program to read Chinese biographic data, categories of information had first to be identified. The problem was that not all aspects of real careers are readily classifiable. But inasmuch as career characteristics must be grouped to make such data machine-readable and applicable to the identification of probable factions, we selected the simplified set of categories described above. Several of the concepts require additional refinement: field-army affiliation, promotion and demotion, and the civilian/military and insider/outsider distinctions.

Determining Field-Army Affiliation

Determination of a field-army affiliation is by no means easy. Some persons have overlapping field army affiliation throughout their careers, and some backgrounds are so obscure that identification of field-army affiliation is impossible. An example of the former is Hsiao K'o, who was associated with the First, Third, Fifth, and Fourth field armies and then left the military to become Vice Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. Since his longest and earliest association was with the First Field Army and he had close ties with Ho Lung (the father of the First), particularly during the Long March, it seemed appropriate to classify him as a member of the First Field Army. In general, estimates of field-army affiliation must be derived from data on historical and personal ties.

Military unit numbers (such as corps, division, and regiment), combat orders, battles, and area of field-army operations became important elements for judging field-army affiliation. A simplified chart of field-army evolution (see Fig. 2) provides a basic guide for this purpose. The chart explains the selection of field-army affiliation, particularly after 1955, when the military-regional structure replaced the field-army system. In principle, military-unit affiliation should take precedence over geographic power base. Thus, the personnel of the 26th Corps should be regarded as affiliated with the Third Field Army, even though they have been located in the Shantung Military District, a power base of the Fifth Field Army and a subordinate of

Red Army Period 1927-1930	Red Army Period 1931-1936	8th Route Army Period 1937-1945	Liberation Army Period 1946-1954	Military Regions 1955-1973	Affiliated Corps since 1954	Founders
Hsiang-O-Hsi Soviet Red 4th Corps (West Hunan) Red 6th Corps (West Hupeh)	2d Front Army Red 2d Army Red 6th Army	120th Division Shansi-Suiyuan MD Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia MD 358 Brigade 359 Brigade	1st Field Army (Northwest China MR)	Sinkiang Lanchou	1, 2, 3, 5, 6	Ho Lung
O-Yu-Wan Soviet Red New 4th Corps Red 15th Corps	4th Front Army Red 4th Army 4th Corps 9th Corps 25th Corps 28th Corps 30th Corps 31st Corps 33d Corps	129th Division Shansi-Hopeh-Honan MD 385 Brigade 386 Brigade	2d Field Army (Central China MR)	Ch'engtu Wuhan Tibet Kunming	12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 60 (in Szechwan), 61, 62	Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien Liu Po-ch'eng Chang Kuo-t'ao
	(Stay behind group in Kiangsi) Red 7th Corps (Fang Chih-Min)	New 4th Corps Northern Kiangsu MD North Huai River MD Central Kiangsu MD Southern Kiangsu MD Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei MD Central Anhwei MD Kiangsu-Chekiang MD	3d Field Army (East China MR)	Nanking Fuchou	20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 (in Shan- tung), 27, 28, 30, 31, 33	Ch'en I Su YH
Central (Kiangsi) Soviet Red 3d Corps Red 4th Corps Red 5th Corps Red 7th Corps Red 20th Corps	1st Front Army Red 1st Army Red 3d Army Red 5th Army	115th Division Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning MD Shantung MD 343 Brigade 344 Brigade Independent Regiment Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh MD Hopeh-Shantung-Honan MD	4th Field Army (Manchuria MR) North China (5th) Field Army (North China MR)	Shenyang Canton Shantung Inner Mongolia Peking	38, 39, 40, 41 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 54, 55 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68	Lin Piao Nieh Jung-chen

Sources: William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 37, January-March 1969, p. 27; idem, *The Chinese High Command*, charts A, C, E, G, and I.

Fig. 2 -- The evolution of field armies since 1927

647.
pc. 15

Red Army Period 1927-1930	Red Army Period 1931-1936	8th Route Army Period 1937-1945	Liberation Army Period 1946-1954	Military Regions 1955-1973	Affiliated Corps since 1954	Founders
Hsiang-O-Hsi Soviet Red 4th Corps (West Hunan) Red 6th Corps (West Hupeh)	2d Front Army Red 2d Army Red 6th Army	120th Division Shansi-Suiyuan MD Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia MD 358 Brigade 359 Brigade	1st Field Army (Northwest China MR)	Sinkiang Lanchow	1, 2, 3, 5, 6	Ho Lung
O-Yu-Wan Soviet Red New 4th Corps Red 15th Corps	4th Front Army Red 4th Army 4th Corps 9th Corps 25th Corps 28th Corps 30th Corps 31st Corps 33d Corps	129th Division Shansi-Hopeh-Honan MD 385 Brigade 386 Brigade	2d Field Army (Central China MR)	Ch'engtu Wuhan Tibet Kunming	12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 60 (in Szechwan), 61, 62	Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien Liu Po-ch'eng Chang Kuo-t'ao
	(Stay behind group in Kiangsi) Red 7th Corps (Fang Chih-Min)	New 4th Corps Northern Kiangsu MD North Huai River MD Central Kiangsu MD Southern Kiangsu MD Hupei-Honan-Anhwei MD Central Anhwei MD Kiangsu-Chekiang MD	3d Field Army (East China MR)	Nanking Fuchow	20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 (in Shan- tung), 27, 28, 30, 31, 33	Ch'en I Su YU
Central (Kiangsi) Soviet Red 3d Corps Red 4th Corps Red 5th Corps Red 7th Corps Red 20th Corps	1st Front Army Red 1st Army Red 3d Army Red 5th Army	115th Division Hopeh-Jehol-Liaoning MD Shantung MD 343 Brigade 344 Brigade Independent Regiment Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh MD Hopeh-Shantung-Honan MD	4th Field Army (Manchuria MR) North China (5th) Field Army (North China MR)	Shenyang Canton Shantung Inner Mongolia Peking	38, 39, 40, 41 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 54, 55 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68	Lin Piao Nieh Jung-chen

Sources: William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 37, January-March 1969, p. 27; idem, *The Chinese High Command*, charts A, C, E, G, and I.

Fig. 2 -- The evolution of field armies since 1927

the Tsinan Military Region. However, when neither field-army nor military-unit affiliation is known, geographic location becomes the sole basis for judging. For example, deputy commanders of the Wuhan Military Region between 1950 and 1965 are assumed to be affiliated with the Second Field Army if no data are available on pre-1950 unit assignment. For those whose backgrounds are known only after the Cultural Revolution, particularly those who have become prominent since the formation of the revolutionary committees, beginning in January 1967, field-army affiliation should be treated as unknown. Under the same principle, if one person has served in several field armies, those for 1938 and 1954 should be decisive.⁸ When there were two or more such affiliations during this period, a rare occurrence, affiliation is based on length of service and degree of personal association.

For civilian officials for whom pre-1950 data are limited, the determination of field-army association is based mainly on geographic location between 1950 and 1960, because most civilians had accompanied the occupying field army in 1949 to 1950. Those whose field-army affiliations were unknown prior to 1954 and who served at the Center (such as in the State Council) for more than ten years after 1950 should be considered as the central elite (Sixth Field Army). The geographical structure of the field-army power bases follows:

First Field Army

Lanchow Military Region: Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and
Tsinghai
Sinkiang Military Region: Sinkiang

Second Field Army

Ch'engtu Military Region: Szechwan and Tibet
Kunming Military Region: Kweichow and Yunnan
Wuhan Military Region: Honan and Hupeh

Third Field Army

Fuchou Military Region: Fukien and Kiangsi
Nanking Military Region: Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kiangsu

Fourth Field Army

Canton Military Region: Hunan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung
Shenyang Military Region: Heilungkiang, Kirin, and
Liaoning

Fifth Field Army

Peking Military Region: Hopeh, Inner Mongolia, and Shansi
 Tsinan Military Region: Shantung

Sixth Field Army

The Center: Peking (the central Party, government, and
 military establishment is coded as Sixth Field Army)

Distinguishing Insiders from Outsiders

Military-region and generational affiliations are used to determine who is an insider and who is an outsider. A man who had been in the same military region for at least one full generation (a crisis cycle) prior to a new appointment is considered an insider; a man who came from another military region and stayed less than a generation period is an outsider. In other words, if a civilian or a military official was appointed in Lanchou Military Region during the twelfth-generation period (between April 1969 and December 1971), he had to have been in the Lanchou Military Region in the tenth-generation period (January 1964 to January 1967) in order to be considered an insider. For example, Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing was transferred to Kiangsi in 1967 (eleventh-generation period) from Shantung and became First Secretary of the Kiangsi Provincial Party Committee in December 1970 (twelfth-generation period). However, in the tenth-generation period, Ch'eng had been in the Tsinan Military Region; he was therefore considered to be an outsider to the Fuchou Military Region in 1970.

Many outsiders who were chairmen or vice chairmen of province-level revolutionary committees on the basis of this criterion retained outsider status when they became secretaries of the Party committees for the same provinces. In general, when a man disappears from a post, he is counted as an outsider; if, however, he reappears in the region in the following generation period, he is counted as an insider. Insiders remain insiders when they reappear in the same region after a period of disappearance.

Military-region rather than, for example, field-army affiliation was chosen as an insider/outsider criterion because: (1) the military region system, which replaced the field-army system, has been in existence since 1954; (2) military-region boundaries are clearer than

field-army-area boundaries; (3) military-region affiliation can apply to both civilian and military cadres; and (4) like field-army affiliation, military-region affiliation is a specific, readily available, long-term indicator, and reflects institutional as well as personal loyalty.

Distinguishing Between Civilian and Military

For the civil-military distinction, it was decided that those who assumed military positions after the Cultural Revolution, particularly political commissars who had not had a military career prior to 1968, would be considered civilians. Thus, Hua Kuo-feng, a Party cadre who became a political commissar of the Hunan Military District in August 1970, was considered civilian rather than military. Hsieh Hsüeh-kung of Tientsin is another example of a civilian holding a military position. Also considered to be civilians are Kuomintang generals who defected to Communist China and assumed civilian posts.

The following three categories are considered to be military personnel: (1) those who held military rank before the abolition of the rank system and who have served primarily in the military since 1949; (2) those who held military rank before but have not been engaged in military work for a long time; and (3) those who held no military rank, but have served in and interacted intensively with the military for over fifteen years.

Determining Promotions and Demotions

Promotion and demotion are very useful concepts to examine elite mobility, but they also impose some complicated conceptual problems. For example, there is the problem of the relative importance of offices at the same administrative level: Should a transfer from the position of commander of the Canton Military Region to commander of the Nanking Military Region be a promotion or demotion? There is also a problem of judging upward or downward mobility when officials assume ostensibly equivalent positions in different institutions. For example, should a transfer from a Party position to a similar one in the government or military structure be considered a promotion or demotion? Then, there is the problem of upward or downward mobility involved in changing

levels in the hierarchy within the same institution. Should the change from commander of the Canton Military Region to vice minister of Defense be considered a promotion or demotion? These decisions require continuous refinement and extensive knowledge of the Chinese bureaucracy.

Other problems result from lack of data. A simultaneous loss and gain of position for an individual may represent a political compromise. The net result of such a compromise may be either a promotion or a demotion. However, since we have neither the data to weight the two positions, nor access to the opinion of the individual regarding the worth of the shift, it is hard to judge whether it constitutes a net gain or loss. Our solution is to count the shift as one demotion and one promotion in the overall statistical aggregation.

These conceptual and technical problems, however, should not prevent efforts to pursue elite mobility through promotions and demotions. By not assigning weight to movement between positions at the same administrative level, movement into a different institution at the same level, or questionable promotion or demotion, there remains sufficient specific information for identifying upward or downward mobility. For this study, promotions include the following categories: (1) new appointments; (2) upward mobility within the same level of the same institution -- for example, from alternate member of the Party Central Committee to full member; and (3) movement within the same institution, from a lower to a higher level -- for example, from deputy commander of a military district (provincial level) to deputy commander of a military region (regional level).

Specific promotions from one position to another are listed in Fig. 3 for the military hierarchy, Fig. 4 for the Party hierarchy, and Fig. 5 for the government hierarchy. Demotions should be the reverse of the promotion ladder and should include purges, dismissals, and disappearances. Death is not considered a demotion in this study.

C. POPULATION

A commonly discussed problem in selecting political and military leaders is the definition of *political elite*, that is, those who have

the *authority and power to control aspects of the decisionmaking process*. This process includes the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of issues.⁹ We further postulate that formal position in China's military and civil hierarchy reflects political power. Thus we define a political elite conceptually in a functional way; but we select the elite on the basis of institutional positions.

The key elite for purposes of this study, which covers the period from 1956 to September 1973, includes members of the Politburo, full members of the Central Committee (provided they hold or have held one or more of the positions listed in figures 3-5), ministers of the State Council, chiefs and political commissars of the service arms, commanders and first political commissars of military regions, commanders and first political commissars of military districts, governors of provinces, chairmen of provincial-level revolutionary committees, and first secretaries of provincial-level Party committees.

A person may be promoted to any of the above positions from a lower level, for example, from secretary of a provincial-level Party committee to first secretary of that committee. In such a case, the lower position is also coded in this study. In other words, if an individual reached any of the positions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, any of the other positions listed on pp. 12-13 of this study that he may hold or have held were also recorded for that individual. For example, Chiao Kuang-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1964 to the time of this research (September 1973), was elected a full member of the Tenth Central Committee. He was included in this data set because of his position as a full member of the Central Committee, but his position as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs was also coded.

Data can be extended, if warranted, to include alternate members of the Central Committee, vice ministers and directors of the State Council, deputy chiefs of the service arms, deputy commanders and deputy political commissars of the military regions and military districts, vice governors and vice chairmen (revolutionary committee) of the provinces, and secretaries and deputy secretaries of the provincial-level Party committees. Sparseness of data precludes any meaningful analysis of the positions lower than that of deputy at the provincial level.




Fig. 3 -- Promotions in the military hierarchy




Fig. 4 -- Promotions in the Party hierarchy

D. RESEARCH MODEL

These background variables require imaginative manipulation to test hypotheses about personal mobility in China. Given the weakness of data, particularly the severe shortage of personal documents and speeches to identify specifically the Chinese leadership's attitudinal behavior, we have to use quantitative analysis and conceptual models to overcome the limitation of research materials. As Karl Deutsch wrote, we need to combine the insight of the literary and historical




Fig. 5 -- Promotions in the government hierarchy

traditions of political scholarship with the quantitative skills of analysis and verification¹⁰ to advance our understanding of Chinese political behavior.

What statistics are appropriate for this elite analysis is another crucial concern. In evaluating what might be a suitable statistical test, we examined several standard parametric and nonparametric methods, such as analysis of variance, regression analysis, discriminant analysis, t test, and chi-square, but discarded them as unsuitable

for our present purposes. To apply such sophisticated quantitative techniques or models, more time would be needed to devise ways of deriving new variables from the existing variables and to enlarge the data set. It would also be necessary to design ordinal- and interval-type measurements for applying nonparametric statistics. The tests finally chosen for this study are frequency distribution, cross-tabulation distribution, means, and standard deviation. A chi-square-like test is also employed to calculate expected, actual, and the deviation of actual from expected distribution of promotions and demotions (see Section IV).

Foci of research on China's political and military leadership are shown in Fig. 6. We have explained in this and in the previous section why and how we selected these biographical variables; we will now present several hypothetical conceptual and operational measures for data manipulations in order to test some assumptions, such as indicators of domestic political turning points, indicators of personnel mobility and interfactional changes, career and mobility patterns, and assessment of regime characteristics. These indicators will, it is hoped, become effective tools for understanding the PRC's political behavior.

E. INDICATORS OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL TURNING POINTS

We may hypothesize, on the one hand, that personnel changes increase during domestic crises. We can compute the rate of annual personnel shifts, including new officials and those who have disappeared, then juxtapose this rate with historical periods of crisis and relatively peaceful times. Correlation of these two factors may identify a range of personnel continuity and discontinuity, which, in turn, may become an indicator of political turning points.

On the other hand, we may find that cycles of crisis and tranquility may be reflected in personnel shifts in which disappearances and purges occur during the crisis and new appointments come during times of relative calm. Our premise is that new personnel appointments result from compromises of the contending groups and that this process of compromise may be possible only in the calm following a

Variables of Biographic Data

Place of Birth
Year of Birth
Generation
Field-Army Affiliation
Commander or Commissar
Military or Civilian
Combat Experience
Education (Civil & Military)
Military Region Affiliation
Functional System Affiliation
Position Level or Rank, by Year
Other

*Assumptions to Be Tested*

- | |
|---|
| 1. Indicators of Political Turning Points |
| 2. Indicators of Interfactional Mobility |
| 3. Assessment of Regime Characteristics |
| 4. Career Types and Mobility Patterns |
| 5. Other |

Fig. 6 -- Foci of research on PRC leadership

crisis. Thus, the Eighth Party Congress of September 1956 could be held after the tumult of the Korean War period; the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969 followed the end of the Cultural Revolution; and the Tenth Party Congress of August 1973 followed the "Victory of Smashing the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique."

This reasoning suggests that the rates of personnel disappearances -- rather than new appointments -- during the eighteen years studied may be the better indicator of domestic political crisis. And

if more leaders disappear during domestic crises than during periods of calm, a perceived rate of disappearance can become an indicator of leadership struggle and political turning points.

This approach can be applied to local levels. At the provincial level, for example, we hypothesize that personnel continuity exists in the *core* provinces where military-region headquarters are located. Core provinces tend to have stronger factional cohesion (fewer outsiders) than the weaker *marginal* provinces, in addition to having lower personnel turnover. Consequently, a leadership struggle for political positions is likely to occur first in the marginal provinces and then move to the core provinces or the national level. Thus, personnel turnover in the marginal provinces becomes significant, because it can give advance warning that shifts are likely to occur in the core provinces or at the national level.

Ascendency of the military in domestic politics can be another indicator of a decisive political turning point. When military intervention in the political situation is motivated by desire for power, or is based on the conviction that such intervention is essential for maintaining law and order, the shift in status between civil and military cadres will show some shift in national priority and even indicate the status of economic development and social stability. An economic setback, political conflict, and social instability may increase pressure for the military to step in. Thus, if the military representation in the top leadership increases, it can indicate the occurrence of another domestic crisis.

Generational shifts can also become an indicator of a political turning point. To the extent that they may indicate rapid transformation from a traditional to a modern society, such changes could engender periods of societal instability. The abrupt emergence of a younger generation during the Cultural Revolution seems to support this hypothesis.

The pace of generational shift seems to have slowed since 1971. The older leaders' opposition to the assumption of power by the younger may have climaxed between September 1968 and the summer of 1971,

when the membership of new Party committees across the land seemed to reflect a return of the first two generations to power at all levels. The Central Committee of the Tenth Party Congress provides additional data for testing this hypothesis. If the Tenth Central Committee shows a narrowing of the generational gap, followed by a relatively more stable China than was the case following the Ninth Party Congress, then the generational variable can provide an explanation.

An indicator of domestic political stability or instability would not only provide greater comprehension of the PRC's domestic politics, it could also forecast the PRC's probable attitudes toward the external environment. For example, some empirical studies suggest that a domestic crisis tends to generate within the PRC hostile attitudes toward neighbors, as illustrated by the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962¹¹ and the general hostility toward foreign countries during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969.¹²

Needless to say, empirical research is needed to link this index with likely policy outcomes. When we establish empirically such linkages, we will be more confident in suggesting the possible impact of China's internal political crisis on the Asian security environment. In the meantime, the personnel arena provides a means of observation.

F. HYPOTHESES ON INTERFACTIONAL MOBILITY

Research and analysis in this section must identify and evaluate indicators of the existence and behavior of interest groups engaged in a competition for power on China's domestic stage. What are the reliable indicators of the existence and behavior of such interest groups? Can we explain the domestic political process on the basis of their behavior? Have the military regions emerged as factional units and their commanders as factional bosses? What is their relationship with the Center? If we can answer these questions, we can make a great step forward in understanding China's political system in action. The following hypotheses require testing:

If leaders sharing the same background have collectively received promotions, if their promotions as representatives of such affiliations have been statistically unusual, or conversely, if certain leaders

distinguished by shared loyalties have suffered collective purge and demotions, we may tentatively conclude that these indicators have some utility for understanding China's internal political conflict system.

Background variables (see Fig. 6, p. 25) will be examined -- each independently -- to determine the mobility of the leaders who share the same background and loyalties. If distributions of promotions and demotions among different generations, for example, reveal different behavior patterns, and if these patterns can be verified by historical events, then these background variables can become useful indicators of group behavior. If further tests show that the ratio of military-region affiliation is higher than the ratio of field-army affiliation in the field-army power bases, then we may conclude that the former may have gradually replaced the latter as the basis for loyalty among China's elite.

However, this trend may become clear only on the provincial or the military-region level, while field-army ties continue to play an intricate role at the national level. Thus, the rise and fall of Lin Biao promptly affected promotion and disappearances of his Fourth Field Army officials at the national level, but had less impact at local levels.

We can assume also that if a field-army faction (or factions) places the largest share of outsiders in a military region or a province (particularly where clear factional domination is lacking), then this faction tends to enjoy the greatest power at the Center. In this case, outsiders are cross-tabulated against their field-army affiliations. The same technique can be employed to examine military-region factions.

Lastly, we can hypothesize that northerners and southerners may represent different interests if (1) promotion of northern leaders is obvious in technological branches of the military, such as the air force, armor, engineers, signals, and second artillery, and (2) the rising generation of northern hero-leaders (Korean War heroes) has become the backbone of the post-Cultural Revolution PLA.

If these hypotheses are valid, the implications are significant. We will have not only reliable indicators of the existence of different behavior patterns, but also indicators that can extend research and

interpretation to suggest the existence of various interest groups. Some understanding of changes of interest-group representation at the national level puts us in a better position to assess the changing characteristics of the regime at different stages of the political process.

G. HYPOTHESES ON ASSESSING REGIME CHARACTERISTICS

Changing proportions of interest-group representation in each regime may indicate predictable changes in Chinese policy preferences and priorities. The emergence of a technical managerial stratum of political leaders might be reflected in the increasing appointment of professional, better educated, younger generations, and personnel affiliated with the industrially richer military regions. Manipulation of biographical data can thus become an indicator of dynamic changes in national and regional priority over time.

Although the use of dichotomies in conceptualizing types of regime is convenient and appropriate, given the initial efforts toward systematizing research on Chinese political leadership and behavior, the typically oversimplified nature of dichotomies should be refined. The often-mentioned dichotomy between a conservative and a radical regime, or between the left and the right, is excluded in the present study because this dichotomy relates to a high level of abstract ideological affiliation. Evidence of unmistakable ideological motivation and attitudes is difficult to define or obtain.¹³ For these reasons, the measurement of regime types requires more methodological thinking and more data than the time for the present study would allow. Instead, a conceptual continuum is employed in this section to dilute the "either-or" dichotomy:¹⁴ Rather than attempt to determine regime types, we propose to assess the changing proportions of interest groups to describe changing regime characteristics, which, in turn can be useful indicators of policy trends. Following are some hypotheses related to such assessments.

Changing regime characteristics reflect in the changing ratio of military to civilian members, of professionals (such as commanders and managerial bureaucrats) to ideologues (such as commissars and Party propagandists), of younger generations (third and younger) to older

generations (first and second), and in the changing makeup of regional coalitions (leaders of which three or four military regions dominate the decisionmaking organs). Changing regime characteristics reflect also in the profile of upward and downward movement after each crisis. In this case, mobility is cross-tabulated against the background variables listed in Fig. 6, above. And finally, changing regime characteristics reflect in the changing ratio of regional representation. A trend toward regionalism in the appointment and firing of political leaders would show that (1) insiders tended to account for a larger share of political action in the regions, and (2) outsiders tended to account for an increasing share of political action in the national level positions (such as the Central Committee of the CCP).

This proportional measurement of the composition of decisionmaking units can also apply to the regional level. Thus, we will identify which regions tend to stress youth as opposed to age, professionals as opposed to ideologues, and military as opposed to civilian control.

Implications of these hypotheses can be significant. Assuming that military regions have become the focal units for promotion and, consequently, focal units of interest-group loyalty, regional bosses will be able to provide reliable career patronage for their subordinates. From this, we can assume further that their regional power will be strengthened and their bargaining power with the Center will be increased. The continuation of this trend in China could mean that the power holders in key military regions would appear as kings, or at least kingmakers. Thus, power holders at the Center must grasp any opportunity to stop this trend.

Studies of bureaucratic and organizational politics suggest that differences in the preferences of the regime would ultimately affect the order of policy priority. In military terms, for example, differences in organizational viewpoints (such as ground forces versus navy or air force) would affect the priority of security values and goals, the priority of perceived threat to those values and goals, and the preferred strategy and tactics for deploying available resources. Specifically, for example, the General Staff Department, the Navy, the Air Force, and the General Rear Service Department tend

to emphasize the strategic roles of the PLA and advocate military policies that would be carried out by the PLA.¹⁵ If more soldiers with such backgrounds hold key positions in the military structure, we may expect a trend of professionalism and all that it implies.

In general, military and Party leaders differ on resource allocations.¹⁶ One would expect the military to press for more resources than the financial minister, for example, would supply. Therefore, we may want to search for a pattern of reductions of military personnel in the decisionmaking organizations. If such a pattern exists, the defense budget would probably decrease.

In sum, we assume that if we are able to ascertain from biographical analysis which factions or interest groups have increased their political power, we will be in a better position to project China's likely policy trends in such areas as trade, technology transfer, and attitudes toward external environments.

H. CAREER PATTERNS

The last category of data manipulation is the examination of PRC leadership career patterns. Since we know little about these patterns, it is extremely difficult to postulate hypotheses for testing. Instead, we ask questions that will provide guidance for data manipulation, and we hope that some career patterns will emerge from the generated data and that these patterns will permit us to postulate hypotheses.

We would like to know the distribution of leaders under study who have had a single promotion or demotion, several promotions or demotions, mixed promotions and demotions, and neither promotion nor demotion during their careers. These career types may reveal the degree of political vulnerability imposed by demotions. For example, do single demotions or even purges destroy political careers? If not, what type of demotion or how many demotions does it take to destroy a career? Can the rehabilitation of purged cadres reveal the state of the PRC's political system?

It is also worth examining the career mobility of each career type. How do they move upward or downward? Do active interactions exist between the Center and the local in which promoted personnel tend to

move from local positions to positions in Peking? Do interactions exist among different military regions in which promotions or demotions take place across different regional units? Can the data show that, through the eighteen years under study, some positions tend to be advantageous while others are disadvantageous?

Based on these questions, we will design computer programs to examine the data.

I. CONCLUSION

Obviously, the hypotheses and questions listed in this section are by no means exhaustive, nor do they include all the possible ways to manipulate the data. Certainly, more hypotheses and questions can be suggested. However, the list in this section alone is more than one researcher can do in a one-year study. Therefore, this author will select enough hypotheses to test the utility of computer application in data manipulation and to reveal some of the PRC's political behavior patterns through personnel analysis.

III. INDICATORS OF DECISIVE POLITICAL TURNING POINTS

Since 1956 there have been three power struggles resulting in purges of leaders of Politburo rank. These power struggles have also marked decisive turning points in the PRC's internal politics. This study is an attempt to evaluate, on the basis of biographical data, internal political developments during the eighteen years of Communist rule in China. We propose to base our investigation on the following three indicators of political turning points: (1) the rate of personnel purges, (2) the ascendancy of military personnel in civilian political roles, and (3) personnel shifts in marginal provinces as a forecast of similar changes in core areas and at the national level.

A. PURGE AS AN INDICATOR OF POLITICAL CRISIS

Mao Tse-tung attempted to introduce new concepts of economic and social development during the late 1950s, when the dissociation from the Soviet concept of economic and social development was in process. He launched extensive campaigns aimed at total collectivization and a labor-intensive concept of development. In 1959, P'eng Teh-huai, then Minister of Defense and a Politburo member, openly criticized Mao's extreme policies and was purged. As a result of that criticism, the planned level of collectivization was lowered to reduce the stringent demands for material sacrifice. The result was that Mao's original program was replaced by an alternative that offered the ruling elite a new option and led to factional struggle.¹⁷

The behind-the-scene factional conflict over power and political direction found its expression in the controversial Socialist Education Movement. When a majority of the Party leaders opposed Chairman Mao, the conflict came out into the open. Mao and Lin Piao mobilized the youth for the Cultural Revolution outside the control structure of the Party. The civilian Party machine was destroyed, and between 1966 and 1968, many Politburo members, including Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen, were purged. A significant result of this power struggle was the infiltration by military leaders of the political decisionmaking process.

Then Lin Piao, Minister of Defense and heir apparent to Mao, was purged in 1971, in part because of his challenge to Mao's leadership and in part because of his heavy-handed placement of military men in important government positions. Lin's fall marked the gradual return to power of the older, civilian cadres.

If the hypothesis that more high-ranking officials are purged or dismissed during a domestic crisis is valid, we would expect to find that the higher ratio of purges in 1958-1959, 1966-1968, and 1970-1971 marked a decisive political turning point. Our expectations were substantiated.

Table 1 and Fig. 7 summarize data regarding purges and appointments between 1957 and 1973. They show that during the periods 1958-1959, 1966-1968, and 1970-1973 more than 1 percent of the total number of officials in our sample were purged. Indeed, the purge rate reached 1.5 percent in 1958, one year before P'eng Teh-huai was ousted, and 1.1 percent a year later. During the Cultural Revolution, the purge rate reached 3.4 percent in 1966, 25.4 percent in 1967, and 16.3 percent in 1968. The rate was 11 percent in 1971, when Lin Piao was purged, and 2.7 percent the year before.

The data reveal a significant pattern of correlation between purges and crisis. When the top leaders engaged in a serious power struggle that changed the course of domestic political development, the purge rate reached the 1 percent mark. It is also important to note that the highest rate occurred the year before the purges reached the Politburo level. The purge rate of 3.4 percent in 1966 should have warned us of a turbulent crisis, namely, the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, a high purge rate (1 percent in this study) should alert us to look for shifts among the PRC's top leadership and to try to identify possible changes in the PRC's internal policies.

Our data prior to the Cultural Revolution, however, does not show a clear pattern of disappearances and purges occurring during a crisis and new appointments coming during times of relative calm. Figure 7 reveals that from 1956 to 1965 purges and new appointments appeared to run parallel, while after that time promotions followed purges.

Since the Cultural Revolution, the number of purges appear to have peaked about two years before the number of new appointments. The

Table 1

PURGES AND APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICIALS, 1957-1973

Year	No. of Officials in Sample	Purged		Appointed	
		No.	%	No.	%
1957	233	1	0.4	22	9.4
1958	266	4	1.5	51	19.2
1959	272	3	1.1	21	7.7
1960	271	1	0.4	22	8.1
1961	269	0	0	9	3.3
1962	273	1	0.4	14	5.1
1963	276	1	0.4	10	3.6
1964	289	1	0.3	26	9.0
1965	305	2	0.7	36	11.8
1966	292	10	3.4	7	2.4
1967	280	71	25.4	30	10.7
1968	245	40	16.3	69	28.2
1969	270	0	0	155	57.4
1970	261	7	2.7	17	6.5
1971	263	29	11.0	35	13.3
1972	233	3	1.3	13	5.6
1973	266	4	1.5	55	20.7

1967 peak of purges was followed by the peak of new appointments in 1969, when the Ninth Party Congress was held. The pattern was repeated with the peak of purges in 1971, when Lin Piao was ousted, followed by the peak of new appointments two years later in 1973. After major purges since the Cultural Revolution, it has appeared to take about two years for the competing factions to consolidate before they can agree to hold a Party congress. It is only when purges and appointments take place on a large scale that cycles of crisis and relative tranquility are reflected in personnel shifts in which purges and dismissals occur during the crisis and new appointments come during times of relative calm.




Fig. 7 -- Ratio of purges and appointments, 1956-1973

B. ASCENDANCY OF THE MILITARY AS AN INDICATOR OF CRISIS

The military's entry into the politics of new nations and new regimes has almost always been coupled with major changes in the political, economic, and social order. The political activities of the military occur largely in response to tensions associated with these rapid changes. When the dominant political group cannot cope with political, economic, and social developments, political pressure by another faction to expand its role to meet the internal crisis follows. Moreover, in political systems in which leadership changes are rigid and uncompetitive, conspiratorial power politics has been the traditional means for change. Under these circumstances, the army has often been a tool in the struggle for domestic political power, either to maintain one faction in power or to help another gain power.¹⁸

In Communist China, the Great Leap Forward and communization brought rapid political, economic, and social changes. Following the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, Mao's control over the Party, a civilian institution, was weakened. His opponents expanded their role to meet the internal crisis and to oppose his leadership. Mao then allied himself with the army through Lin Piao to attack his opponents in the Party, particularly through the Socialist Education Movement.¹⁹ Mao and Lin used the Cultural Revolution to paralyze civilian Party and government institutions, and the PLA assumed the dominant role in China.

Our data on the distribution of civilian and military personnel reflect such historical development in China and fit into the pattern of military intervention in the politics of developing nations. Table 2 shows the rise of the military in 1967 to about 66 percent of the 300 positions surveyed and in 1968 to a peak of about 74 percent of 306 positions. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, and particularly after the fall of Lin Piao, the gradual strengthening of civilian institutions has encouraged a steady reduction in the number of civilian posts held by the military. Military representation in 1973 dropped to about 57 percent, the level of military/civilian distribution on the eve of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Table 2

CIVILIAN/MILITARY DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERSHIP
BY YEAR, 1956-1973

Year	Civilian		Military		No. of Positions ^a in Sample
	No.	%	No.	%	
1956	175	54.7	145	45.3	320
1957	176	52.5	159	47.5	335
1958	205	53.1	181	46.9	386
1959	200	51.4	189	48.6	389
1960	196	50.5	192	49.5	388
1961	195	50.1	194	49.9	389
1962	203	50.9	196	49.1	399
1963	198	49.6	201	50.4	399
1964	205	49.0	214	51.0	419
1965	207	47.4	230	52.6	437
1966	186	46.0	218	54.0	404
1967	102	34.0	198	66.0	300
1968	80	26.1	226	73.9	306
1969	153	33.3	307	66.7	460
1970	156	34.2	300	65.8	456
1971	175	36.9	299	63.1	474
1972	176	37.9	289	62.1	465
1973	224	43.1	296	56.9	520

^aAn official may hold more than one position concurrently.

The success or failure of political, economic, and social policies in China, therefore, can be expected to have a direct effect on the increase or decrease of military political activity. If the present dominant political groups were to experience another economic setback or political conflict, or if the country were to experience new social instability, the top military leadership would be encouraged again to assume power to cope with the problems caused by civilian failures. Thus, an increase of military representation in the top leadership positions above the 57 percent level of 1973 should indicate that

another major domestic crisis had occurred. Conversely, a continuing decrease in the number of military political and economic roles can indicate a general trend toward normalcy and the gradual strengthening of Party and government institutions.

C. PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN MARGINAL PROVINCES
AS AN INDICATOR OF POLITICAL CHANGE

An attempt will be made here to examine and compare demotion patterns in the core and marginal provinces. Assuming that the rate of demotions tends to be higher in the marginal provinces and that these demotions occur prior to those in the core provinces, personnel shifts in the marginal provinces can provide advance warning of leadership discontinuity in the core provinces and possibly at the national level.

Two criteria are used to define a core province: First, it must contain the headquarters of a military region (thus it is politically important), and second, at least 80 percent of those competing for promotions in the province must be insiders (thus it is traditionally stable in terms of continuing strength of insiders). A marginal province does not have a military-region headquarters, and more than 50 percent of those who are eligible to be promoted or demoted are outsiders. Based on these criteria, we have selected Kiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, and Shantung as the core provinces to be used in this study, and Heilungkiang, Kiangsi, Peking, and Shensi as the marginal provinces.

The results of our examination of demotions in these core and marginal provinces by year from 1957 to 1973 are summarized in Table 3 and Fig. 8. The percentage distribution of purges and demotions do not reveal any clear pattern distinguishing core provinces from marginal provinces in terms of the demotion rate. The marginal provinces do not necessarily have a higher rate of purges and demotions; furthermore, prior to the Cultural Revolution, purges and demotions did not necessarily occur earlier in the marginal provinces than in the core provinces.

Figure 8 shows, however, that since 1964 sharp rises in the number of purges and demotions appear to have occurred in the marginal provinces before they occurred in the core provinces. The sharp increase

Table 3
DEMOTIONS BY SELECTED CORE^a AND MARGINAL^b PROVINCES

Year	Demotions in Core Provinces		Demotions in Marginal Provinces	
	No.	%	No.	%
1957	1	5.6	0	0
1958	1	4.2	0	0
1959	1	3.0	3	12.5
1960	2	6.5	2	9.1
1961	1	3.3	0	0
1962	0	0	0	0
1963	0	0	1	4.0
1964	1	3.3	0	0
1965	2	6.6	5	25.0
1966	0	0	3	15.8
1967	9	3.0	7	38.9
1968	10	38.5	4	23.5
1969	1	34.4	0	0
1970	2	8.4	4	17.4
1971	2	3.8	6	25.0
1972	3	4.2	1	4.0
1973	5	6.9	2	7.1
<i>Total</i>	<i>41</i>		<i>38</i>	

^aKiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai, and Shantung.

^bHeilungkiang, Kiangsi, Peking, and Shensi.

in the demotion rate in the selected marginal provinces between 1964 and 1968 was followed by a similar increase in the selected core provinces in 1966-1969. The demotions peaked in the marginal provinces in 1967 and in the core provinces the following year. Another sharp increase in the demotion rate in the marginal provinces between 1969 and 1971 suggests that a similar rise will follow in the core provinces. Indeed, there has been an upward trend in demotions in the core




Fig. 8 -- Demotion ratio in selected core and marginal provinces, 1957-1973

provinces since 1971, a trend that was bolstered by the shuffling of military-region commanders in January 1974 to the extent that these commanders concurrently held Party and government positions. The loss of these positions will certainly increase the demotion rate of the core provinces in 1974.

The inclusion of only the top level of provincial positions in this study of course limits the population available for intensive analysis, and it may well be that the pattern revealed in Fig. 8 is an accidental result. Nevertheless, research that utilizes the core and marginal concepts to examine and project nationwide personnel shifts and political crises is a promising subject. It would be desirable to extend the population at the local level to include at least deputies -- deputy commanders and deputy political commissars of military regions, deputy commanders and deputy political commissars of military districts, secretaries and deputy secretaries of provincial Party committees, and vice governors and vice chairmen of provincial-level revolutionary committees.

Macroanalyses of personnel shifts as illustrated in this section can only suggest new or changing political developments. Therefore, microanalyses are needed to identify more specifically the nature and directions of such changes. Further thought and the refinement of analytical tools may enable us to combine the macro- and microanalyses so that indicators can not only alert us to a possible political turning point, but also to the content and direction of the change.

IV. INDICATORS OF INTERFACTION MOBILITY

This section summarizes data on Chinese military and civil elite promotion and demotion between 1956 and 1973. A basic premise is that if leaders sharing the same background, such as field-army or military-region affiliation, have survived successive purges, and if their survival as representatives of such affiliations has been statistically unusual, or conversely, if certain leaders distinguished by shared loyalties have suffered collective purge, we may tentatively conclude that these indicators have some utility for understanding China's internal political conflict.

Collating data for the purpose of identifying interest groups was simplified by earlier studies and by the fact that personnel assignments still reflected recent political-military history. That is to say, five field armies had conquered certain regions of China during the Civil War (1945-1950). Thereafter, the military as well as civil leaders of those field armies assumed military or civil roles in the governing of the newly acquired areas. It seems probable that the same five major field-army elite groups remained in control when these geographic areas were divided into military regions and provinces. As a device for collating data, therefore, it was decided to organize biographical materials along lines to show personnel shifts in each of the five geographic base areas. For the purpose of explaining personnel shifts (and possibly factional politics) over the eighteen years under study, several lines of political cleavage have been examined separately. We will describe, in order of persuasiveness, the statistics pertaining to the most important indicators of, primarily, personnel mobility and, secondarily, possible political conflict and interest-group affiliation. However, no effort is made here to apply regression analysis to determine which are the more significant indicators, because such analysis requires further conceptual refinement and additional research.

Before examining each factor of political cleavage, some definition of concepts and explanation of analytical method are warranted.

The concepts of promotion and demotion are crucial because they are used to determine whether certain leaders with shared loyalties have collectively shared upward or downward mobility. Then it is essential to explain the method of statistical analysis used to indicate that such collective upward or downward mobilities are statistically unusual and show different patterns. The definitions of promotion and demotion were discussed in Section II; an explanation of the method of statistical analysis follows.

A. METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

To examine unusual (such as conflicting) factional relationships on the basis of personnel mobility -- i.e., promotion and demotion -- it is essential to show that the promotions and demotions were not randomly or impartially distributed. A basic assumption is that in a situation where competition for position does not exist, the distribution of promotion and demotion would likely be in proportion to the sizes of the participating groups. If substantial differences exist between the actual and expected distributions of promotions and demotions, then these differences should warrant careful analysis.

For example, when a faction receives a larger share of promotions and a smaller share of demotions than its expected share by impartial distribution based on the number of its members, then this faction appears to have gained political favor. On the other hand, when another faction shows the reverse pattern of promotion and demotion, the data suggest that one faction's gain may have contributed to the other's loss. If the actual distribution of promotions and demotions differ from the expected distribution, and if such differences can be shown to correspond to actual historical events, then such analysis can be useful for observing Chinese group political behavior.

The computation of such differences requires three elements: total size of the group (such as generation or field army), actual distribution of promotion and demotion, and expected distribution. Let us assume that there were thirty members of the first generation in 1960, twenty of the second generation, and ten of the third generation: The total number of officials in 1960, then, was sixty. The

actual number of promotions that year was ten for each generation. Obviously, these thirty promotions were not impartially distributed, inasmuch as the first generation was three times as large as the third, but both received the same number of promotions.

How should these thirty promotions be impartially distributed? To compute impartial (expected) distribution of promotion, we should compute the promotion *index*. Thirty of sixty officials were promoted. The promotion index is $30 \div 60 = 0.5$. If each official had 0.5 opportunity for promotion, the first generation should receive fifteen promotions (30×0.5), the second generation, ten promotions (20×0.5), and the third generation, five promotions (10×0.5). The differences were -5 for the first generation, 0 for the second generation, and +5 for the third generation. This means that the first generation received five fewer promotions than expected and the third generation five more than expected in 1960.

Applying this method of statistical analysis, we will compute the differences in actual and expected distribution of promotions and demotions for each year from 1957 to 1973. We want to know (1) if these differences reveal unusual patterns among different generations, different field armies, different military regions, insiders and outsiders, commanders and commissars, military and civilian personnel, and different functions, and (2) if these patterns correspond to historical events in which some groups are clearly favored over others.

B. FIELD-ARMY AFFILIATION

The first indicator of interfactional behavior that we will examine is field-army affiliation. Figure 9 shows actual promotion and Fig. 10 demotion distribution as deviations from expected distribution (see Appendixes 2 to 4 for the data on which Figs. 9 and 10 are based), by field army by year. These data reveal several interesting phenomena.

The data suggest that from 1956 to 1964 there were no drastic differences in upward or downward mobility among the field armies. The deviation between the expected and the actual distribution was relatively small, suggesting either a lack of concern for field-army factions or

Actual No. of Promotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 9 -- Deviation of actual from expected promotion distribution, by field army

Actual No. of Demotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 10 -- Deviation of actual from expected demotion distribution, by field army

a balance of power among them. In any event, this pattern was shattered shortly before the Cultural Revolution, when promotion and demotion distributions among the field armies began to deviate significantly from the expected.

The most obvious beneficiary of this change was the Fourth Field-Army faction led by Lin Piao. Although this faction had a high rate of promotion and a relatively low rate of demotion after Lin Piao became Defense Minister in 1959, the Fourth Field Army reached the peak of its prominence during the Cultural Revolution, particularly from 1967 to 1969. During this same period, however, the First Field Army, associated with P'eng Teh-huai and Ho Lung, lost power to a significant extent. Then, following the purge of Lin Piao in 1971, many of his Fourth Field-Army proteges were demoted, and from that year on, Fourth Field-Army promotions were below expected and demotions considerably above.

Meanwhile, reflecting interfactional competition, the powerful Second Field Army (led by Chen Hsi-lien, Commander of the Shenyang Military Region from 1960 to 1973 and Commander of the Peking Military Region since January 1974), and Third Field Army (led by Hsu Shih-yu, Commander of the Nanking Military Region from 1954 to 1973 and the Commander of the Canton Military Region since January 1974), showed increased promotions and reduced demotions. The Second and Third field armies appeared to benefit the most from the fall of Lin Piao and the Fourth Field Army.

The rise and fall of the Fifth Field Army also relates to its outstanding leaders. The purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in December 1965, was preceded by a sharp drop in promotions for the Fifth Field Army (see Fig. 9) and an increase in demotions in 1965, 1966, and 1967²⁰ (see Fig. 10). Then Yang Ch'eng-wu, another Fifth Field-Army man, became Acting Chief of Staff in 1966. More important for appointments, he was Secretary-General of the Party Military Affairs Committee from September 1967 until his dismissal in March 1968.²¹ During this period, Fifth Field-Army faction promotions increased sharply (particularly in 1967), and demotions dropped below expected in 1968.

In general, the data show that the political fortunes of many top leaders (both military and civilian) have risen and fallen along with those of key leaders (particularly military) with whom they have been closely associated throughout their careers. When men such as P'eng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, and Lin Piao were in the ascendancy, they placed many of their followers in key positions; when they were purged, many of their close associates fell from favor along with them. The evidence is convincing that long-term affiliations, such as with the field-army system, are a significant factor in identifying competing factions and interfactional mobility.²²

C. GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES

It is inevitable that younger generations should replace older ones. That such shifts must influence policy perspectives is also likely. It is our thought, however, that the precise significance of such shifts remains obscure, since policy perspectives and loyalties are likely to be finely "tuned" by factors other than generational affiliation. Nevertheless, we know that general attitudinal patterns may be associated with generations and that this subject deserves further exploration. In anticipation of such future research, our data may provide indexes of shifts in the influence of different generations, whatever their collective attitude patterns may be.

Figure 11 shows actual promotions and Fig. 12 demotions as deviations from the expected distribution of promotions and demotions, by generation (for data, see Appendixes 5 to 7). The data show different generational behavior.

As shown in these two figures, the deviation of actual from expected promotions and demotions, relatively minor from 1957 to 1964, appears to have increased sharply since 1964. This pattern is similar to that exhibited by the field armies and may indicate a lack of concern for generational factions prior to 1964. Nevertheless, the Socialist Education Movement, launched in 1962, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969 might have influenced different generational distribution of promotions and demotions, particularly between members of the first generation (average age in 1973 was 68), such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the third generation (average age in 1973 was 60), such as Chang Chun-chiao.

Actual No. of Promotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 11 -- Deviation of actual from expected promotion distribution, by generation

Actual No. of Demotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 12 -- Deviation of actual from expected demotion distribution, by generation

For this group of top leadership as a whole, the eighteen-year period under study brought a noteworthy shift in favor of the better-trained, better-educated, and technologically oriented members of the third generation. The rate of promotion for the third generation steadily rose and reached its peak in 1968. Conversely, the first and, to some extent, the second generations have shown an overall decline in promotions since 1957; in fact, first generation promotions remained below the expected number throughout the period. Although the fourth and younger generations also showed an increase in the number of promotions, their proportion thus far seems to indicate an insignificant role in the competition for political power.

One could argue that since the first generation officials started their political careers in the early 1950s with high positions, they would likely have less opportunity for promotion. Also, one would naturally expect the first generation, at their age and probably declining health, to fade from the political scene. However, two unusual ups and downs between the first and third generations deserve special attention.

One was the first generation's abrupt drop in promotions and increases in demotions during the Cultural Revolution, at the same time that the third generation showed an unusual surge in promotions and a sharp drop in demotions. This phenomenon corresponded to one of the purposes of the Cultural Revolution: to remove many of the "old men" to pave the way for the rise of a younger generation in their late fifties.

Another unusual curve occurred after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. First generation promotions increased in 1972 to within one of the expected number, and at the same time, demotions decreased to below expected. The fate of the third generation was the reverse: By 1973 its promotions were substantially below and demotions above the expected number. Indeed, the rehabilitation and reappointment of Teng Hsiao-p'ing as the Vice Premier, the revived activity of Yeh Chien-ying and, to a lesser extent, of Chou En-lai at the Center, and the continuing power of old comrades such as Hsu Shih-yu, Chen Hsi-lien, and Li Hsien-nien parallel this statistical revelation.

A relatively clear pattern emerges: Groups with a high rate of promotion simultaneously tend to have a low rate of demotion, and vice versa. This is a possible indication of collective behavior among generation groups in terms of their downward and upward mobility. Why is such a pattern particularly clear between the first and the third generations? During the Cultural Revolution, did Mao and Lin Piao simply exploit an existing conflict between the first and third generations -- or did they initiate and agitate a conflict for their political purposes? These intriguing questions, together with the unusual patterns revealed from the data, should warrant close examination of generational behavior and its implications.

If political conflicts indeed exist between the first and the third generations, it may not necessarily indicate different political preferences between these two generations. The conflict may naturally derive from an urgent desire of the third generation (whose average age in 1973 was already 60) to seek political positions from the old. Their frustration at such a long wait for political prominence would make them political opportunists to the extent that there were opportunities to challenge their elders.

D. CIVILIAN-MILITARY CONFLICT

China analysts tend to differentiate between civilian and military political leaders, on the premise that the military seek to gain control and to govern China. The shifting power positions of civilian and military leaders, based on promotions and demotions between 1957 and 1973, are shown in Figs. 13 and 14 (for the data, see appendixes 8 and 9). The figures indicate several significant patterns that deserve explanation.

After Lin Piao became Minister of Defense in 1959 and launched the Learn-from-the-PLA and the Socialist-Education movements, and particularly from 1963 to 1965, the military received more promotions and fewer demotions than would be expected on the basis of impartial distribution. The proportion of civilian promotions and demotions was the reverse of the military pattern between 1963 and 1965.

Actual No. of Promotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 13 -- Deviation of actual from expected promotion distribution for civilian vs. military leaders

Actual No. of Demotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 14 -- Deviation of actual from expected demotion distribution
for civilian vs. military leaders

A similar shift was evident during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1968, when the collapse of the Party and government institutions gave the military the opportunity to replace purged civil leaders in essential civil positions. Our data show that in 1967 and 1968 civilians received fewer promotions than expected, while the military gained an extra five promotions each year. Differences in demotion distributions were even more drastic. In two years, 1967 and 1968, civilians suffered a total of eighty-eight more demotions than expected, while the military received eighty-six fewer demotions than they would have, had demotions been impartially distributed.

However, while the military continued to gain high representation in the leadership group under study, their proportion of promotions dropped in 1969, at the end of the Cultural Revolution. A factor that contributed to the decline in promotions for the military and rise in promotions for civilians was the "election" of the many new members of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP, "representing the masses." This phenomenon might suggest that an effort was already under way in 1969 to reduce military power by reducing the number of promotions for military personnel. An effort to reinstitute civilian control of political organizations had been publicly advocated in the Party press in 1969. This effort was only moderately successful, because in 1969 the military continued to hold about 67 percent of the total of 460 positions (see Table 2, p. 38).

Promotions and demotions were somewhat mixed in 1971. The military received more promotions but also more demotions than expected. Two factors contributed to this phenomenon: One was the establishment, between December 1970 and August 1971, of provincial-level Party committees in which many military men assumed key positions; the second was the fall in late 1971 of Lin Biao, which was followed by the fall of many of his military associates. The military promotion rate dropped sharply in 1972 and 1973, while the demotion rate increased somewhat. Conversely, the civilian promotion rate surged and the demotion rate dropped. The pressure to transfer functions from the military to civilian personnel appeared to be more effective after the fall of Lin Biao.

E. COMMANDERS VERSUS COMMISSARS

Scholars invariably assess the depth of the Party-military conflict in terms of the respective participants' stand on various issues. There is a tendency to characterize the *commissars* (career military leaders in the PLA General Political Department whose function has focused on ideological indoctrination, loyalty, mass mobilization, etc., rather than on combat command) as "the Party within the military," that is to say, as the natural adversaries of the military *commanders* on many issues. We have criticized this indicator of interest-group affiliation and behavior because it fails to consider other, probably higher loyalties (including the traditional field-army and the geographical military-region loyalties). Nevertheless, because differences in attitude tend to separate commanders and commissars, and because the institution of the General Political Department has provided a formal career channel whereby a commissar *might* escape claims on his loyalty based on earlier field-army or military-region affiliation, it seemed useful to trace the contrasting careers of members of these two categories as reflected in their promotions and demotions between 1956 and the end of 1973.

Figures 15 and 16 show the deviation of actual promotion and demotion distribution from expected distributions. (For this data, see Appendixes 10 and 11.) The promotion and demotion patterns of the military commanders and the political commissars do not reveal clear differences, as did the indicators discussed earlier. The commissars appear to have been favored as a group to the extent that they received their expected share or more of promotions for all but two of the years in the period under study. Only in 1962 and 1973 did they receive fewer promotions than they might have expected, and in each case it was only one below expected. The pattern of commissar demotions, however, paralleled (rather than contrasted with) that of promotions, and for most of the years surveyed, commissars also received more than their expected number of demotions.

The absence of clearcut differences in the promotion and demotion patterns for commanders and commissars may indicate that the conflict between these two groups is not as sharp as some analysts imply. One

Actual No. of Promotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 15 -- Deviation of actual from expected promotion distribution for commissars vs. commanders

58

77

Actual No. of Demotions
Above or Below Expected No.




Fig. 16 -- Deviation of actual from expected demotion distribution for commissars vs. commanders

can also add that the functional differences between commanders and commissars are not as sharp as some analysts imply. For example, the General Political Department's formal responsibilities include duties that involve such major military tasks as assessing combat readiness, overseeing aspects of military research and development, and evaluating officer performance.²³ Furthermore, a number of the men included in this study (ranging from 13 percent in 1957 to 5 percent in 1973) held the posts of commander and commissar simultaneously (actual numbers are given in Appendix 10).

The behavior pattern of the political commissars suggests that the "military party" may have disassociated from the civilian party. Although the CCP was shattered during the Cultural Revolution, the commissars suffered fewer demotions from 1965 to 1968 than expected, had the distributions been impartial (see Fig. 16).

F. MILITARY-REGION AFFILIATION

Is it possible that each military region has developed its own interest group, wherein loyalties are much stronger than those among former field-army comrades? Certainly, it is worth postulating that those older field-army loyalties may have found a new focus in the self-serving bureaucratic systems of each military region. The leaders of a given region are likely to focus on issues at home and, at the same time, to defend key political positions against outsiders.

To test these hypotheses, we examined political and military leaders on the basis of their apparent affiliation with a military region. An insider, as defined in Section II-B, is someone who had demonstrated the ability to survive a succession of crises. Therefore, an insider in the present context would be someone who had been appointed to a military region during one crisis period, had survived through the next crisis, and had remained in the military region (though not necessarily in the same post) in the third. A measure of a military-region faction's viability and independence would thus be its ability to resist outsider interference and appointment.

The relative independence or self-sufficiency of a military region is reflected in Table 4 by the extent to which personnel changes, both

Table 4

INSIDER/OUTSIDER PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS
BY MILITARY REGION, 1956-1973
(in percentages)

Military Region	I n s i d e r s			O u t s i d e r s		
	Promoted 1956-73	Demoted 1956-73	As % of all leaders in 1973	Promoted 1956-73	Demoted 1956-73	As % of all leaders in 1973
Lanchou	60.3	78.3	83.3	39.7	21.7	15.4
Sinkiang	55.6	33.3	50.0	44.4	66.7	50.0
Ch'engtu	66.7	66.7	62.5	33.3	33.3	37.5
Kunming	52.3	50.0	88.9	47.7	50.0	11.1
Wuhan	68.0	78.9	70.6	32.0	21.1	29.4
Fuchou	50.0	70.6	66.7	50.0	29.4	40.0
Nanking	80.9	85.7	82.8	19.1	14.3	13.8
Canton	71.2	73.7	82.6	28.8	26.3	13.4
Shenyang	74.4	60.0	100.0	25.6	40.0	0
Peking	65.8	71.0	70.8	34.2	29.0	29.2
Tsinan	82.6	68.0	55.6	17.4	31.2	33.3
Center	52.8	85.3	83.3	47.2	14.7	15.4

promotion and demotion, resulted in a high proportion of promotion (or demotion) of insiders. When outsiders became active (that is, received a relatively high proportion of promotions and demotions) in military regions, these regions tended to show signs of political instability. In four military regions (Sinkiang, Kunming, Fuchou, and the Center), outsiders received more than 40 percent of the promotions. We know that these regions were subjected to repeated invasion by outsiders during and after the Cultural Revolution; apparently these invasions succeeded in eroding the status of traditional local interest groups.

Thus, the data in Table 4 underscore the relative power of insiders in military regions and argues for the existence and increasing importance of military-region factions. This finding is consistent

with that of career mobility by military-region geographical units shown in Table 12, Section VI (p. 87). The data show also that 75 percent or more of individual upward and downward mobility took place within the same military region. The implication of this development is significant. When the military region became the base for promotion and, consequently, the focus of interest-group loyalty, it was able to provide reliable patronage for the career success of its officers. This suggests that as the power of the military regions increased so did their basis for bargaining with the Center. The continuation of this trend in China could mean that those in power in key military regions would become the kingmakers. Thus, those in power at the Center must feel the need to grasp any opportunity to resist this development. The extensive reshuffling of military commands revealed in Peking on New Year's Day 1974 can be interpreted as an indication that Mao and Premier Chou En-lai recognize the power of the military regions and have taken steps to lessen the personal power of the military-region leaders.²⁴

G. FUNCTIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

If the process of modernization continues in China, competition among the various specialized agencies and service arms in the Chinese civil and military establishments will probably become an increasingly important factor in shaping interest groups. It is reasonable to expect that in China, as in other countries with large and powerful civil and military establishments, various functional interest groups (such as government agencies and military service arms) will engage in complex bureaucratic politics, involving competition for budgetary allocations, debates over responsibilities and roles, and differences over strategy and tactics. It is also reasonable to believe that the increasing requirement for modernization and professionalism may cause the prevailing system based on the field army and military region to be superseded by a bureaucratic function system involving a different set of rival loyalties.

However, it may be some time before modernization and professionalism in China reach the point at which the new bureaucratic

interservice system clearly becomes the focus of individual or collective loyalties. Our limited data on 484 top leaders reveal little evidence that leaders sharing the same bureaucratic functions received promotions or demotions collectively.

An effort was made to combine the twenty different functions listed on pp. 11-12 in order to compress the data. Military cadres in the Armor Corps, Infantry, and Public Security are merged into a category called "conventional forces"; in the Artillery Corps, Engineer Corps, and Second Artillery (missiles) they are merged into "military technocrats"; in the Signal Corps, Railway Corps, General Chief of Staff, and General Rear Service -- into "military managers"; and in the General Political Department -- into "military ideologues." On the civilian side, political-legal and personnel-organizational cadres are merged into one category called "political and personnel." The remaining functions are broad enough to stand for this comparison.

The twelve new systems are: (1) conventional forces, (2) military technocrats, (3) military managers, (4) Air Force, (5) Navy, (6) military ideologues, (7) propaganda and education, (8) industry and communications, (9) finance and trade, (10) foreign affairs, (11) agriculture and forestry, and (12) political and personnel. Data on the distribution of leaders according to these twelve functional categories, distribution of actual promotion and demotion, distribution of expected promotion and demotion, and deviations of actual from expected promotion and demotion are provided in Appendixes 12 through 18.

These analyses can serve as useful raw data in further explorations or bureaucratic differences and rivalries. Consideration of such functional differences as a working assumption is a promising aspect that can provide an alternative frame of reference to help explain variations in policy and their consequences.

In summary, four of the six indicators examined in this section appear to show clear differences in group behavior in terms of upward and downward mobility. Generational and field-army behavior differences seem to have increased since the Cultural Revolution. The data also show clear shifts in status between civilian and military leaders. As for the distinctions between insiders and outsiders, the data reveal an

overwhelming majority of insiders holding personnel assignments, and when the insiders failed to remain in the majority, the areas in which they functioned tended to be subjected to repeated invasions by outsiders, particularly during and after the Cultural Revolution.

Most importantly, the different behavior patterns between generations, field armies, civilians and the military, and insiders and outsiders are consistent with actual historical developments.

V. ASSESSING REGIME CHARACTERISTICS

The utility of personnel analysis to assess regime characteristics will be discussed in this section. Observation of different behavior patterns of interest groups or factions through promotion and demotion can be a way of assessing Chinese regime characteristics. However, it cannot be used to assess all regime characteristics, because the group or groups that show the highest promotion rate are not necessarily the dominant faction in a regime. Conversely, the group that suffers the greatest proportion of demotions is not necessarily the least powerful faction in a regime. In fact, it is entirely possible that it can be the major party, faction, or interest group that is losing its representation. Therefore, analysis of all the leaders included in this study, rather than only those promoted and demoted, provides another method of assessing regime characteristics.

For the reasons discussed in Section II, the dichotomy between conservative and radical or left and right is excluded in assessing regime characteristics, because this dichotomy is based on a high level of abstract ideological judgment. Evidence of ideological motivation and attitudes is particularly difficult to define or obtain. Instead, the changing proportions of the component groups are assessed to determine the changing regime characteristics.

This section will examine the data on selected elite position-holders in selected years -- 219 men in 1956, 269 in 1959, 275 in 1963, 282 in 1966, 241 in 1969, and 221 in 1973. Each of these years was chosen primarily because it was a period of relative calm following or preceding a more turbulent time and position tenure is relatively stable in a period of calm. By 1956, the domestic tumult of the Korean War period had subsided sufficiently to assemble the Eighth Party Congress. The rise of Lin Piao and the fall of P'eng Teh-huai occurred in 1959; 1963 represented the readjustment and recovery following the Great Leap Forward. Data from 1966, which marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, afford the opportunity to study the hierarchy before and after that upheaval, when compared with elite analysis for

1969, which encompassed the end of the Cultural Revolution and the time immediately following the Ninth Party Congress, held in April 1969. The Ninth Party Central Committee, elected by that Congress, collapsed in late summer of 1971 with the removal of Lin Biao, Defense Minister and heir apparent to Mao. The Tenth Party Congress was convened in 1973.

The reasoning behind the selection of these six years may be debatable, but they certainly provide opportunities to compare personnel changes from one status to another. As stated in Section II, changing regime characteristics may reflect changing proportions of interest groups. Investigating these characteristics by examining the changing ratios of field-army affiliations, military-region affiliations, insiders and outsiders, generations, civilian and military cadres, commanders and political commissars, Korean War participants, and functional affiliations is the objective of this section.

To clarify the overall statistical aggregation, an effort is made to exclude from analysis those functions that appear to be symbolic or cosmetic. Cosmetic personnel include members of the Party Central Committee who appear to have no real constituencies and hold no other important political positions indicating political power or influence. Using these criteria, 48 persons are described as cosmetic personnel.²⁵ Of these, 46 have unknown generational affiliation; 25 have unknown field-army affiliation; 25 have unknown military-region affiliation; and 21 have unknown function affiliation. In general, they are peasants and workers who represent the masses and were elected to the Central Committee as tokens: Mao wanted such people to symbolize his anti-bureaucratic "mass-line" policies in order to regain the loyalty of the masses.²⁶

A. DISTRIBUTION OF FIELD-ARMY REPRESENTATIVES

Table 5 summarizes the distribution of leaders in the six selected years on the basis of earlier affiliation with the now defunct field armies. In 1956, former members of the Center elite represented 22.4 percent of the total elite in the sample for that year; former members of the Second Field Army, 19.1 percent; Third Field Army, 17.8 percent; Fourth Field Army, 13.7 percent; Fifth Field Army, 13.2

Table 5

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY FIELD-ARMY AFFILIATION, 1956-1973

Field Army	1956	1959	1963	1966	1969	1973
First						
No.	27	32	35	40	23	23
%	12.33	11.90	12.73	14.18	9.54	10.41
Second						
No.	42	53	52	63	50	45
%	19.18	19.70	18.91	22.34	20.75	20.36
Third						
No.	39	49	52	51	45	45
%	17.81	18.22	18.91	18.09	18.67	20.36
Fourth						
No.	30	46	47	56	60	35
%	13.70	17.10	17.09	19.86	24.90	15.84
Fifth ^a						
No.	29	34	35	25	23	22
%	13.24	12.64	12.73	8.87	9.54	9.95
Center						
No.	49	52	52	45	31	34
%	22.37	19.33	18.91	15.96	12.86	15.38
Unknown						
No.	3	3	2	2	9	17
%	1.37	1.12	0.73	0.71	3.73	7.69
Total	219	269	275	282	241	221

^aThe North China Field Army.

percent; First Field Army, 12.3 percent; and those whose field-army affiliation was not known, about 1 percent. Those who had been members of the Center elite declined to about 13 percent by the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, but rose slightly in 1973 to about 15 percent. Fourth Field-Army representation, on the contrary, increased steadily to almost 25 percent in 1969; when Lin Piao officially became the heir apparent to Mao, the Fourth Field Army became best represented group in the leadership, followed by the Second Field Army at 20 percent, and the Third Field Army at 18.7 percent. The Center elite sank to 12.8 percent and the First Field Army elite to 9.5 percent.

Then, after the fall of Lin Piao in late summer 1971, the Fourth Field Army representation dropped from 25 percent to about 16 percent. The Third Field Army elite increased from 18.7 percent to 20.4 percent, and the Center elite from 12.9 percent to 15.4 percent. In 1973, the Second and Third field armies resumed their status as the leading field-army factions in the leadership group, each holding about 20 percent of the representation.

The data reveal several interesting phenomena:

1. Chou En-lai's rise after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 parallels the rise of the formerly Center and Third Field-Army elites. If Chou has attempted to restore central power, he has scored only moderate success, increasing Center-elite representation from 12.9 percent in 1969 to 15.4 percent in 1973.
2. The Third Field Army replaced the Fourth with the largest elite group representation in 1973. Chou's apparent collaboration with former Third Field Army leaders can strengthen his status in the leadership struggle.
3. The substantial increase of the unknown category from less than 1 percent in 1966 to 3.7 percent in 1968 to about 8 percent in 1973 may indicate an increasing number of representatives who do not have ties with the field-army system and, consequently, a gradual decline of field-army ties among the emerging elite.

B. DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY-REGION REPRESENTATIVES

China's political system may be described at present as comprising a Center and eleven geographic "parties" representing the eleven military regions listed in Table 6. These military-region parties, much more narrowly geographic in concept than were the field-army elites, are deeply committed to local interests. Each military-region elite is likely to focus on issues "at home" and attempt to defend key positions against appointment of persons from outside the area. With increasing power in the hands of insiders, as we have identified in the previous section, it is important to determine if there is a trend toward military-region representation and what proportion of representation is held by each military region.

Table 6 shows the nationwide distribution of military-region leaders from 1956 to 1973. It offers several interesting trends. First, it seems clear that the Center's representation has steadily declined, while that of most of the military regions has increased. In 1956, leaders whose primary roots were at the Center held almost 48 percent of the elite positions. This plurality, however, dropped to about 31 percent in 1973, while representation of all military regions except Sinkiang and Ch'engtu increased in 1973 as compared with 1956. Nanking, Canton, Peking, and Shenyang are particularly noteworthy for their steady increase and larger share of representation.

Such trends suggest that more power is now exercised at the regional level than in the period immediately following the Communist accession to power in 1949. The steady and increasing representation of the key military regions mentioned above is also significant if their representation in the top leadership reflects political power. If this is the case, these key military regions should receive special attention, for their pursuit and protection of their own interest may significantly affect the outcome of national policies, particularly when these military regions are also the geographic heartlands of their respective field-army parties, such as Shenyang for the Second Field Army, Nanking for the Third Field Army, Canton for the Fourth Field Army, and Peking for the Fifth Field Army.

Table 6

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY MILITARY-REGION AFFILIATION, 1956-1973

Military Region	1956	1959	1963	1966	1969	1973
Sinkiang						
No.	7	7	7	6	3	2
%	3.20	2.60	2.55	2.13	1.24	0.90
Kunming						
No.	7	12	12	15	9	9
%	3.20	4.46	4.36	5.32	3.73	4.07
Nanking						
No.	18	23	23	25	30	26
%	8.22	8.55	8.36	8.87	12.45	11.76
Canton						
No.	13	19	18	21	27	21
%	5.94	7.06	6.55	7.45	11.20	9.50
Peking						
No.	17	21	21	24	18	18
%	7.76	7.81	7.64	8.51	7.47	8.14
Ch'engtu						
No.	10	12	11	14	9	8
%	4.57	4.46	4.00	4.96	3.73	3.62
Fuchou						
No.	9	12	12	13	7	9
%	4.11	4.46	4.36	4.61	2.90	4.07
Lanchou						
No.	10	14	18	21	16	15
%	4.57	5.20	6.55	7.45	6.64	6.79
Shenyang						
No.	9	11	12	18	19	19
%	4.11	4.09	4.36	6.38	7.88	8.60
Tsinan						
No.	4	5	5	6	6	4
%	1.83	1.86	1.82	2.13	2.49	1.81
Wuhan						
No.	7	8	8	9	9	8
%	3.20	2.97	2.91	3.19	3.73	3.62
Center						
No.	104	120	122	105	79	69
%	47.49	44.61	44.36	37.23	32.78	31.22
Unknown						
No.	4	5	6	5	9	13
%	1.83	1.86	2.18	1.77	3.73	5.88
Total	219	269	275	282	241	221

C. DISTRIBUTION OF GENERATIONS

Table 7 shows the distribution of the eight generations in China's military and civil bureaucracies from 1956 to 1973. Understandably, one observes a higher percentage of the first generation represented in 1956 than in succeeding years and a gradual distribution of positions to younger generations. It is noteworthy that the ascendancy of the younger leaders and the decline of the old guard reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution. Representation of the first generation dropped from 40.8 percent in 1966 to 26.6 percent in 1969 and of the second generation from 26.2 percent to 25.3 percent, while the third generation gained from 15.6 percent to 22.4 percent and the fourth generation from about 1 percent to 2.5 percent.

This distribution appears to confirm that one of the purposes of the Cultural Revolution was to remove many of those old men (who entered the Army or the Party before December 1936) and to pave the way for the rise of younger generations. Thus, the pattern was consistent with that derived from the distribution of promotions and demotions by generations.

However, these rapid generational shifts have slowed since 1969. Despite some drop in the average age level of the total leadership under study, the first generation cadres retained about the same representation as in 1969 and continued to dominate the leadership group, holding more than 26 percent of the leadership representation. The second generation lost 6 percent and the third lost more than 3 percent between 1969 and 1973.

Given the events of the past five years -- including the decline of youth and the ascendancy of age -- it would seem that Chou En-lai, concerned for the stability of China in its search for social, political, and economic revolution, opted for a slower pace of change from the older generations to the younger. In so doing, he must have encountered opposition from Lin Piao, who had created (probably supported by Mao to some extent) a younger technocracy in the 1960s to replace the old guard. This is not to suggest that Chou opposes the rise of youth. He is too practical to oppose the inevitable.

Table 7

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY GENERATION, 1956-1973

Generation	1956	1959	1963	1966	1969	1973
First						
No.	130	137	134	115	64	59
%	59.36	50.93	48.73	40.78	26.56	26.70
Second						
No.	42	59	69	74	61	42
%	19.18	21.93	25.09	26.24	25.31	19.00
Third						
No.	9	21	25	44	54	42
%	4.11	7.81	9.09	15.60	22.41	19.00
Fourth						
No.	2	2	2	3	6	5
%	0.91	0.74	0.73	1.06	2.49	2.26
Fifth						
No.	1	2	1	1	2	1
%	0.46	0.74	0.36	0.35	0.83	0.45
Sixth						
No.	2	6	4	4	3	2
%	0.91	2.23	1.45	1.42	1.24	0.90
Seventh						
No.	1	1	0	1	3	4
%	0.46	0.37	0.0	0.35	1.24	1.81
Eighth						
No.	1	1	1	0	4	3
%	0.46	0.37	0.36	0.0	1.66	1.36
Unknown						
No.	31	40	39	40	44	63
%	14.16	14.87	14.18	14.18	18.26	28.51
Total	219	269	275	282	241	221

But, he probably saw the consequences of youthful political passions during the Cultural Revolution and apparently concluded that the younger generations' assumption of power must be more measured. His assessment of the role of youth has apparently received the general support of his old comrades, especially the senior and most powerful military regional commanders.

Despite the exclusion of the cosmetic personnel, the group of those whose generation was not known remained relatively large. Their representation steadily increased from about 14 percent in 1956 to 18 percent in 1969 and more than 28 percent in 1973. They were probably the young leaders who assumed positions of power during and after the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, since the data on the entrance into the Party or the Army for the first three generations were readily available, it is reasonable to assume that these unknown leaders would belong to the generations younger than the fourth. The increasing size of the unknown group may signify a process of generational shifts that may imply that real changes will take place when these younger generations emerge into the political power at all levels, including the inner circle.

D. DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 8 shows the changing relationship between civilian and military cadres. Nationwide, military cadres steadily increased in key positions from about 43 percent in 1956 to 67 percent in 1969, while the civilians' majority status in 1956 and 1959 (57 percent and 52.8 percent, respectively) declined to 32 percent in 1969. Between 1969 and 1973, however, the civilians gained modestly to 38.5 percent, and the military cadres dropped to 60.6 percent.

Obviously, the increasing representation of military men from 43 percent in 1956 to 67 percent in 1969 indicates that the military were gradually assuming civil roles in Party and government institutions. The Cultural Revolution favored this trend. The collapse of the Party structure enabled many professional military leaders to replace purged civil leaders in essentially civil roles. The situation in 1969, after the election of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP,

Table 8

DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY LEADERS, 1956-1973

Officials	1956	1959	1963	1966	1969	1973
Civilian						
No.	125	142	135	121	77	85
%	57.08	52.79	49.09	42.91	31.95	38.46
Military						
No.	94	126	139	159	162	134
%	42.92	46.84	50.55	56.38	67.22	60.63
Unknown						
No.	0	1	1	2	2	2
%	0.0	0.37	0.36	0.71	0.83	0.90
Total	219	269	275	282	241	221

was thus reminiscent of the 1949-1950 period, when military men had taken over crucial civil roles in the absence of other qualified leaders.

The fall of Lin Piao in 1971 and the election of the Tenth Party Central Committee in 1973 significantly reduced military representation. Active military leaders dropped from 67 percent in 1969 to about 60 percent in 1973. Paralleling the reduction in military representation was a significant increase in civilian cadres. Lin Piao's fall provided Chou En-lai and Mao with an opportunity to correct the imbalance in favor of the military that characterized the 1969 leadership elite. One should be quick to point out, however, that despite the effort after 1969 to rebuild the Party and revive civilian leadership, military men still held significant power in both civil and military posts in late 1973.

E. DISTRIBUTION OF KOREAN WAR PARTICIPANTS

Before discussing Table 9, which portrays our knowledge of Korean War veterans in the high command, we should remind the reader that our biographic data on the Korean War experience is not entirely reliable. The figures in Table 9 may be considered conservative, in favor of non-participants. It would be natural for a higher percentage of Korean

Table 9

DISTRIBUTION OF KOREAN WAR PARTICIPANTS AMONG LEADERSHIP, 1956-1973

Year	Participated		Did Not Participate		Total
	No.	%	No. ^a	%	
1956	23	31.5	50	68.5	73
1959	39	36.1	69	63.9	108
1963	44	38.3	71	61.7	115
1966	60	42.9	80	57.1	140
1969	68	45.9	80	54.1	148
1970	62	44.9	76	55.1	138
1971	53	43.4	69	56.6	122
1972	51	42.5	69	57.5	120
1973	53	43.4	69	56.6	122

^aIncludes unknowns.

War veterans than is indicated in the table to have held positions in the PLA high command in the 1970s. The percentages shown refer only to those who are known to have been either participants or nonparticipants (including likely unknowns).

Korean War veterans in the PLA high command as a whole increased from only 31 percent in 1956 to about 43 to 46 percent between 1966 and 1969. Although this marked the peak of Korean War veteran representation, there was no sign of erosion of their power thereafter. In 1973, 43.4 percent of the PLA high command were still veterans of Korea.

Some analyses of the Chinese political scene derive significant conclusions from a perceived conflict between participants and nonparticipants in the Korean War. Certainly, it is possible that Korean War veterans share similar views on such matters as the role of firepower; the identity of the primary enemy; the need for professionalism, regularization, and modernization in the PLA; and a host of other issues that confront military leaders. And we must assume that today's leaders perceive today's problems through the lenses of their own experience.

F. DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY FUNCTION

We noted in Section IV-G that the data distribution among the twenty categories based on function was too sparse for meaningful analysis. Although data remained relatively sparse even after merging twenty functions into twelve, some interesting changes began to appear (see Table 10). Any attempt to interpret this extremely limited data can be challenged, but for the sake of methodological inquiry, such an attempt will be made in the hope that discussion can generate refinement. If interpretations are reasonably realistic, the data can become useful supporting evidence.

On the military side, representation of conventional soldiers (including Armor, Infantry, and Public Security) in the high command rose steadily from 1956 to 1969. This should not be interpreted as an expansion of Armor, Infantry, and Public Security forces. Instead, it was more likely due to the increased number of military men who were given political posts following the Cultural Revolution. Representation of military managers -- including career officers in Signals, Railways, General Chief of Staff, and General Rear Services -- gained slowly. Together with the evidence showing increasing representation of Korean War participants, the rising representation of military managers might suggest a trend toward professionalism. However, the steady representation of the military technocrats (including Second Artillery, Engineers, and Navy) suggests a predisposition to limit rapid technical modernization in most conventional weapons fields. The Air Force was an exception to this pattern; although the number of officers involved remained insignificant, Air Force representation gained steadily between 1956 and 1970. This gain and the subsequent drop in 1973 may reflect the Air Force's close tie with Lin Piao.

On the civilian side, two phenomena stand out since 1966. Representation of career cadres in finance and trade and in foreign affairs dropped more than half from 1966 to 1969, but increased again somewhat in 1973. Representation of foreign-affairs specialists rose from 2.5 percent in 1969 to about 5 percent in 1973 and finance and trade experts from 2.5 percent to 3.6 percent. These statistics reflect the ebb and flow of trade and foreign activities since the Cultural

Table 10

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Function	1956	1959	1963	1966	1969	1973
Armor, Infantry, Public Security						
No.	57	76	86	105	110	91
%	26.03	28.25	31.27	37.23	45.64	41.18
Artillery, Engineers, 2d Artillery						
No.	3	4	5	6	5	3
%	1.37	1.49	1.82	2.13	2.07	1.36
Signals, Railways, Gen Staff, Gen Rear						
No.	12	19	17	19	20	15
%	5.48	7.06	6.18	6.74	8.30	6.79
Air Force						
No.	3	6	6	6	9	3
%	1.37	2.23	2.18	2.13	3.73	1.36
Navy						
No.	4	4	4	5	4	4
%	1.83	1.49	1.45	1.77	1.66	1.81
Gen Political Dept						
No.	8	8	9	12	6	9
%	3.65	2.97	3.27	4.26	2.49	4.07
Propaganda, Education						
No.	24	24	23	14	12	13
%	10.96	8.92	8.36	4.96	4.98	5.88
Industry, Communication						
No.	21	26	27	23	18	15
%	9.59	9.67	9.82	8.16	7.47	6.79
Finance, Trade						
No.	22	23	22	19	6	8
%	10.05	8.55	8.00	6.74	2.49	3.62
Foreign Affairs						
No.	13	14	16	14	6	11
%	5.94	5.20	5.82	4.96	2.49	4.98
Agriculture, Forestry						
No.	10	12	12	13	17	17
%	4.57	4.46	4.36	4.61	7.05	7.69
Political, Personnel						
No.	31	37	34	29	17	15
%	14.16	13.75	12.36	10.28	7.05	6.79
Unknown						
No.	11	16	14	17	11	17
%	5.02	5.95	5.09	6.03	4.56	7.69
Total	219	269	275	282	241	221

Revolution: Diplomatic activities and foreign trade, which all but ceased during the Cultural Revolution, have resumed since Premier Chou undertook the active leadership of government affairs. The Tenth Central Committee of the CCP made a large number of appointments, particularly in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, including Chi Peng-fei as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chiao Kuan-hua as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Huang Hua as Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Liao Cheng-chih as President of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, and Wang Cheng as Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington.

G. SUMMARY OF REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS IN THE 1970s

Employing the concepts that have been developed in this study of factional allegiance and behavior in China's domestic political process, we will attempt to assess regime characteristics in 1973 and to project probable trends for the 1970s.

The Second and Third field armies, thanks to both a high rate of promotion and increased representation in the leadership in 1973, regained its status as the dominant field-army party, lost by the Fourth Field Army with the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. Thus, if the Second and Third can continue their historically friendly collaboration, China is likely to remain relatively free of minor leadership crises. The political philosophy and preferences of the senior leaders of these two field-army parties should be closely observed and analyzed for clues to China's development in the next few years. These veteran leaders include Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a founder and the first political commissar of the Second Field Army, formerly Secretary General of the CCP, and currently a Politburo member and Vice Premier; Hsu Shih-yu, Politburo member, senior commander of the Nanking Military Region until December 1973, and currently commander of the Canton Military Region; Chen Hsi-lien, Politburo member, a senior commander of the Shenyang Military Region until December 1973, and currently commander of the Peking Military Region; and Li Teh-sheng, Politburo member, formerly director of the PLA's General Political Department, and currently commander of the Shenyang Military Region.

The declining representation of the Center elite in 1973, on the one hand, and the increasing representation of regional officials, on the other, suggests a trend of political decentralization in China. Therefore, regional demands and preferences might have a more significant impact on China's political behavior in the 1970s than in the earlier years of Communist rule in China. The Nanking, Canton, Peking, and Shenyang military regions are particularly important, because each (1) enjoys a disproportionately large share of leadership representation and (2) is the geographic center of a field army. Furthermore, in view of the ascendancy of the Second and Third field armies, the interests of the geographic heartland of these two field armies and the military regions controlled by their senior military and civilian leaders deserve close observation.

With regard to generational differences in terms of upward and downward mobility, the data show continuous domination by the first generation (members of which entered the Party or the Army before 1928 and whose average age today is in the late sixties), despite their steady decline in leadership representation. The comeback of the old cadres is particularly notable if we examine their promotion rate and rehabilitation from 1971 to 1973 (see Section VI-B). This evidence reflects a relative gain in power of the first generation in 1973.

Thus, given the power of the Second and Third field-army factions since the fall of Lin Piao in late 1971, we might conclude that first, second, and third generation experiences and perspectives are likely to characterize not only the policies of the regional bases, but also those national policies over which Second and Third field-army faction representatives may be expected to have influence in the near future.

A notable change in 1973 has been the reduction in military representation, reflecting a significant return to the military-civilian balance prior to the Cultural Revolution. Mao and Chou appear to have achieved some success in correcting the imbalance in favor of the military that characterized the Lin Piao era by cutting back the political role of the military in the top leadership. If this trend continues, it should be an indication of the gradual strengthening of civilian control of Party and government institutions. However, due

to the continuing strength of the military, there can be no doubt that it will remain active in civilian aspects of Chinese society.

From the viewpoint of function, representation of foreign-trade and foreign-affairs cadres showed a notable increase in 1973, reflecting a much more active communication between China and foreign countries and representing a sharp departure from China's militant isolationism of the late 1960s.

The increasing power -- in the changing pattern of factional affiliations -- of men whose background is not known is another notable change since the Cultural Revolution. These unknowns were likely (1) local leaders who had not previously achieved any important national reputation or stature; (2) "representatives of the masses" with no real constituencies, no real power, and no important political influence; and (3) members of younger generations about whom very little is known. Therefore, although these unknowns might not have direct impact on current politics in China, their increasing representation in the leadership may be a factor contributing to China's changing pattern of factional affiliations.

On balance, Premier Chou En-lai has been active in managing Chinese government affairs since the Cultural Revolution, and particularly since the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. He has apparently received the general support of his old comrades, especially the senior and most powerful military commanders of the Second and Third field armies. Under Chou, the main thrust of China's foreign policy has become more forthcoming, moderate, pragmatic, and flexible. He has led China to resume diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States and continues to be concerned about possible Soviet subversion, as he stated explicitly in his report to the Tenth Party Congress. If Chou survives Mao and remains in a key position to manage China's affairs, it is likely that the prevailing policies will continue and the succession process may be relatively smooth.

In such a situation, Teng Hsiao-p'ing is a likely person to emerge as a leading successor to Chou. His great ability and rich experience as a top-level civilian Party leader and political commissar (see p. 93) are certainly a credit to his quality of leadership. Most importantly,

he is a model representing the current personnel trend analyzed in this study. His connection with the leading field-army faction (the Second) is likely to win support from his former subordinates who are currently important figures, including Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Teh-sheng, Yang Yung (commander of the Sinkiang Military Region), and Chin Chi-wei (commander of the Ch'engtu Military Region).

However, if Mao survives Chou, the palace group led by Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yuan probably will emerge from an opposition status and replace Chou's group as the dominant faction. Some changes in leadership coalition and policy direction will inevitably follow.

VI. CAREER PATTERNS

This data set can also be used to examine elite career types and the mobility patterns of each type through computer programing. The eighteen years from 1956 to 1973 are divided into two periods: the pre-Cultural Revolution period from 1956 to 1965 and the post-Cultural Revolution period from 1966 to 1973. We will examine the career types and mobility patterns of each career type during each period and then compare the findings.

A. SIX CAREER TYPES BASED ON PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS

The elite is divided into six mutually exclusive career types based on the number of promotions or demotions: (1) multiple promotion type in which each official has had more than one promotion between 1956 and 1965 or between 1966 and 1973; (2) multiple demotion type in which each official has had more than one demotion during either period; (3) single promotion type; (4) single demotion type; (5) mixed promotion and demotion type in which the official has been promoted and demoted at least once during each period; and (6) no promotion or demotion type in which the official has held the same position without promotion or demotion during each period.

Table 11 summarizes the data covering the period from 1956 to 1965, for which 344 officials were studied, and from 1966 to 1973, for which 436 officials were studied. Two characteristics common to both periods stand out. First, the mixed promotion and demotion career type was relatively large in both periods, indicating that demotion need not be fatal to a political career in the PRC. In some cases, even officials who were purged or disappeared have been returned to power: Of the 175 officials who were purged or disappeared between 1956 and 1973, twenty-two were rehabilitated. Second, an official who has suffered two consecutive demotions without having been promoted -- as have three officials during the two periods under study -- seems to have reached the end of his political career. No officials in this study survived more than two demotions.

Table 11

SIX CAREER TYPES BASED ON PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS
1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

Career Type	1956-1965		1966-1973	
	No.	%	No.	%
Multiple Promotions	32	9.3	70	16.1
Multiple Demotions	1	0.3	2	0.5
Single Promotions	111	32.2	90	20.6
Single Demotions	24	7.0	115	26.3
Mixed Promotions & Demotions	73	21.2	133	30.5
No Promotions or Demotions	103	30.0	26	6.0
Total	344	100.0	436	100.0

There are marked differences between the two periods, the second having been a time of greater personnel mobility -- including both promotions and demotions -- than the first. Almost one-third of the officials stayed in the same post for the ten years between 1956 and 1965, while only twenty-six officials out of 436 (about 6 percent) stayed in the same post for the eight years from 1966 to 1973. The personnel instability of the second period can be attributed largely to the Cultural Revolution and the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. A similar impact of the Cultural Revolution was demonstrated earlier in this study.

B. PURGED AND REHABILITATED PERSONNEL

Of the 484 top leaders under study between 1956 and 1973, 175 were purged or disappeared -- thirteen (7 percent) before the Cultural Revolution and 162 (93 percent) after 1966. Twenty-two of these men were later rehabilitated. Of the 153 who were not rehabilitated, twenty-seven were holding only one Party position at the time they were purged, and nineteen of these twenty-seven were full members of the Central Committee. Twelve of the 153 were holding only one government position at the time of their purge, and eight of these were

ministers. Thirty of the 153 were holding only one military position when purged; seven were political commissars of service arms and ten were military-district commanders. Twenty-seven of the 153 purged officials were holding more than one position at the Center, thirty-six were holding positions both at the Center and at the local level, and eighteen were holding more than one position at the local level. Data on the positions of three officials at the time of their purges were not available.

One should not draw the conclusion from the apparently large number of purges revealed in the above data that full members of the Central Committee, ministers of the State Council, political commissars of the service arms, and commanders of the military districts are especially vulnerable to purges. We have learned that these particular positions are high risk, because these were the positions involved in our study of 484 top leaders. Had our study included holders of lower-level positions, we might have found their purge rate to be equally high.

An attempt was made to ascertain whether any of the positions involved was more vulnerable or disadvantageous -- or more secure and advantageous -- than any others; however, the data set at hand was insufficient to provide conclusive evidence.

Further examination of the rehabilitation of cadres is worth analysis because the rehabilitation can become an indicator of the state of the political system. What kinds of backgrounds do those rehabilitated have? Do the indications correspond with the larger personnel patterns discussed in the previous section?

It is interesting to note that each of the twenty-two rehabilitated officials held more than one position, both at the time he was purged and at the time he was brought back. This is an indication that each maintained an institutional and/or geographic power base. None of the officials who were full members of the Central Committee but who held no other significant position was rehabilitated. Thus, the data may suggest that officials who are purged or who disappeared tend to have better opportunity to return to power if they have visible ties with an institutional or geographic power base.

Civilians predominated in the group of rehabilitated officials. Of the twenty-two, fifteen (68 percent) were civilians, and of these latter, thirteen (87 percent) were brought back between 1971 and 1973, after the fall of Lin Piao. Considering the fact that only about 52 percent of the 176 officials who were purged or disappeared were civilians, the proportion of rehabilitated civilian cadres was large. Only seven military officers were rehabilitated, and six of them returned in 1972 and 1973.

Another interesting rehabilitation phenomenon is the return of the old cadres. Thirteen (59 percent) of the twenty-two rehabilitated belonged to the first generation, and eleven of them have returned since 1971. Only one belonged to the second and none to the third generation. All seven whose generation was not known came back in 1971 and 1973.

In sum, three characteristics of these twenty-two rehabilitated officials become clear. Civilian rather than military personnel were rehabilitated; first-generation cadres predominated; and most came back between 1971 and 1973. Thus, rehabilitation provides a good indication of the priority given to the return to civilian rule after the fall of Lin Piao, following which, the experienced old cadres of the first generation seemed to be in greater demand than younger cadres. This is consistent with the data in Section V showing that civilian and first generation officials began to show a larger proportion of promotions after Lin's fall.

C. MOBILITY PATTERNS

This section will review the geographic (military-region and Center) and position mobility on the basis of four types of personnel action: multiple promotion, single promotion, single demotion, and mixed promotion and demotion. A main purpose of examining geographical mobility is to see whether upward and downward career mobility in China tends to take place within the same military region or between different military regions. For the sake of convenience, the Center is treated as a twelfth military region (see list of military regions in Table 6, p. 85). Geographic mobility is divided into four mutually exclusive

categories: (1) mobility within the same military region, (2) mobility from one military region to another, (3) mobility from an unknown to a known military region, and (4) mobility from one unknown military region to another unknown military region. There are two time periods: 1956 to 1965 and 1966 to 1973.

Table 12 summarizes geographic mobility in relation to those four types of personnel action. At least 75 percent of upward and downward mobility during both periods occurred within the same military region. Officials who were known to have been both promoted and demoted appeared to show a relatively high percentage of mobility between different military regions -- about 15 percent for the first period and almost 10 percent for the second period. Officials who had been promoted more than once also appeared to move between military regions, although in only about 4 to 9 percent of the cases.

This high percentage of upward and downward mobility within the same military region corresponds with the finding in Section V showing a high degree of insiders active in their respective military regions. This data can be used to support the argument that military regions have been a factor of corporate loyalty based on common geographic location. Whether the shuffling of the eight senior military commanders in January 1974 will change this mobility pattern deserves close observation. In addition, it is also worth examining the mobility of the minority who were transferred from one military region to another. Where did they go? What positions did they assume?

An initial task in analyzing position mobility is to divide patterns of upward and downward mobility into groups that must be mutually exclusive and at the same time include all possibilities. There are thirteen such patterns of *upward* mobility (see figs. 3 to 5, pp. 21-23): (1) from no position (or unidentified position in this study) to a provincial-level position, (2) from no position to a military-region position, (3) from no position to a national-level position, (4) from a provincial-level position to another position at the same level, (5) from a provincial-level position to a military-region position, (6) from a provincial-level position to a national-level position, (7) from one military-region position to another position at the same

Table 12

ELITE CAREER MOBILITY BY MILITARY REGION
AND PROMOTION AND DEMOTION
1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

Type of Mobility	Multiple Promotions				Single Promotions			
	1956-1965		1966-1973		1956-1965		1966-1973	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Within Same Military Region	24	75.00	56	80.00	109	98.20	68	75.56
Between Known Military Regions	3	9.38	3	4.29	0	0.0	0	0.0
From Unknown to Known Military Region	5	15.63	10	14.29	0	0.0	0	0.0
Between Unknown Military Regions	0	0.0	1	1.43	2	1.80	22	24.44
Total	32		70		111		90	

Type of Mobility	Single Demotions				Mixed Promotions and Demotions			
	1956-1965		1966-1973		1956-1965		1966-1973	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Within Same Military Region	22	91.67	126	92.65	58	79.45	106	79.70
Between Known Military Regions	0	0.0	0	0.0	11	15.07	14	10.53
From Unknown to Known Military Region	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.74	10	7.52
Between Unknown Military Regions	2	8.33	10	7.35	2	2.74	3	2.26
Total	24		136		73		133	

level, (8) from a military-region position to a national-level position, (9) from a national-level position to another position at the same level, (10) from purged to an unidentified position, (11) from purged to a provincial-level position, (12) from purged to a military-region position, and (13) from purged to a national-level position. There are also thirteen patterns of downward mobility, which are the reverse of the upward-mobility patterns. Each pattern is then subdivided into four categories: mobility within the military, within the Party, and within the government, or from one of these institutions to another.

Obviously, these categories are too detailed to have extensive data for analysis, and must be merged into broader categories of mobility patterns. Data distribution after the merger of some patterns are shown in the tables that follow.

Table 13 summarizes elite mobility patterns with multiple promotions on the basis of position location and institution, for the periods 1956-1965 and 1966-1973. *From Local to Center* refers to mobility from provincial-level and military-region positions to national-level -- or Center -- positions. Few officials demonstrate this pattern, particularly within the same institution. More officials appear to have upward career mobility within a province or within a military region, categorized in Table 13 under the heading of *Local*. Half of the thirty-two in the first period and thirty-eight of seventy in the second period belong to this category. Multiple promotions within the same institution are rare, the only clear exceptions being the nine local military promotions from 1956-1965. A reason for this exception might be the replacement of the field-army system with the military-region system, when many military positions were created and had to be filled.

Otherwise, most mobility with multiple promotions tends to take place between institutions and may lead to positions in more than one institution. A typical example since the Cultural Revolution is that of a military officer appointed to an additional position in a provincial Party committee or in the government. This phenomenon suggests

Table 13

ELITE CAREER MOBILITY WITH MULTIPLE PROMOTIONS
 BY LOCATION OF POSITION AND BY INSTITUTION
 1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

	No. of Multiple Promotions	
	1956-1965	1966-1973
From Local to Center		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	1
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	3	2
Center		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	1	1
Local		
Within Military	9	0
Within Party	2	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	5	38
Both Center and Local		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	3
Both Local and From		
Local to Center		
Within Military	1	0
Within Party	2	5
Within Government	3	0
Between Institutions	6	20
Total	32	70

that multiple promotions usually mean the acquisition of an extra position, rather than mobility from a lower to a higher rank.

The mobility pattern with single promotions (see Table 14) is similar to that with multiple promotions. Again, little interaction exists between the local organizations and the Center. Only one leader moved from local to Center in the first period and none in the second period.

Most upward mobility is from no position to a position at the national level or to a local position in any institution. The *no position* category includes those who held no known position, as well as those who held positions lower than the deputy level of Party, military, and government institutions, which were not coded in this study. From 1956 to 1965, sixty-three of 111 promotions were from no position to some position on the local level. Of these sixty-three, forty-four were promotions of military officers within the military when the establishment of military regions in 1955 created many new positions. Between 1966 and 1973, sixty-five of the ninety promotions were from no position to one at the national level. Forty-nine of these sixty-five promotions were to Party positions. Obviously, many new faces emerged from unidentified positions to become members of the Ninth Central Committee in 1969 and the Tenth in 1973. This pattern of upward mobility with single promotions from no (known) position to one at the Center or in a local organization -- a pattern consistent with multiple-promotion mobility -- also appears to involve the acquisition of additional positions, rather than a move from a lower rank to higher rank.

Table 15 shows mobility patterns with single demotions. Notably, none was demoted from Center to local in either period. Instead, most of the demotions involve downward mobility from one or more positions at the national or at the local level to the loss of positions or purge. These patterns are particularly obvious from 1966 to 1973. Of a total of 136 demotions, twenty-five represented loss of national-level positions; thirty-eight, purge from national-level positions; seven,

Table 14

ELITE CAREER MOBILITY WITH SINGLE PROMOTIONS
BY LOCATION OF POSITION AND BY INSTITUTION
1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

	No. of Single Promotions	
	1956-1965	1966-1973
From No Position to Center		
Within Military	9	2
Within Party	1	49
Within Government	8	2
Between Institutions	3	12
From No Position to Local		
Within Military	44	5
Within Party	5	0
Within Government	4	0
Between Institutions	10	3
Center		
Within Military	3	0
Within Party	2	2
Within Government	3	0
Between Institutions	9	5
Local		
Within Military	3	1
Within Party	0	0
Within Government	1	0
Between Institutions	5	7
Local to Center		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	1	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	0
From No Position to Local and Center		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	1
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	1
Total	111	90

Table 15

ELITE CAREER MOBILITY WITH SINGLE DEMOTIONS
BY LOCATION OF POSITION AND BY INSTITUTION
1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

No. of Single Demotions			No. of Single Demotions		
1956-1965 1966-1973			1956-1965 1966-1973		
From Center to Local			Center		
Within Military	0	0	Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	0	Within Party	0	0
Within Government	0	0	Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	0	Between Institutions	4	6
From Center to No Position			Local		
Within Military	0	1	Within Military	0	0
Within Party	3	11	Within Party	1	0
Within Government	1	7	Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	3	6	Between Institutions	2	0
From Center to Purged			From Center & Local to Purged		
Within Military	1	8	Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	19	Within Party	0	9
Within Government	2	5	Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	1	6	Between Institutions	0	0
From Local to No Position			From No Position to Purged		
Within Military	1	3	Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	1	Within Party	0	0
Within Government	2	1	Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	2	Between Institutions	2	19
From Local to Purged			From Center & Local to No Position		
Within Military	0	13	Within Military	0	0
Within Party	1	5	Within Party	0	2
Within Government	0	5	Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	7	Between Institutions	0	0
			Total	24	136

loss of local-level positions; thirty, purge from local-level positions; and nine, purge from concurrent positions at the national and local levels. These data clearly suggest that demotion is tantamount to dismissal, to purge, or to disappearance.

Mobility patterns involving mixed promotions and demotions are similar to the patterns discussed above. Data in Table 16 show little interaction between the Center and the local level. No official moved from national-level position(s) to local-level position(s) during either period. Only three officials in the first period and five officials in the second period moved from local-level positions to national-level positions. Mobility within the local level is also a predominant pattern.

The mobility patterns of officials with mixed promotions and demotions are further examined in Table 17 from the viewpoint of mobility patterns between the level of the positions (national, military-region, and provincial) on the one hand, and the changing number of positions on the other, for the periods 1956-1965 and 1966-1973. There are nine mutually exclusive categories including combinations of higher, lower, and the same levels and more, fewer, and the same number of positions. The most numerous group by far comprised those officials who ended their upward or downward mobility with the same number of positions at the same level. This pattern is particularly striking from 1956 to 1965, when more than 75 percent of the officials were in this category. Interestingly, no official in either period ended up at a lower level with more positions, or with the same number of positions. This is consistent with the pattern of little interaction between different levels.

In summary, several common patterns of career mobility are worth pointing out. The overall data show little interaction between the Center and the local level. Downward mobility from the Center to the local level is rarer than upward mobility from the local level to Center.

Mobility within a given province or military region is the predominant pattern, regardless of the number of promotions and/or demotions.

Table 16

ELITE CAREER MOBILITY WITH MIXED PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS
 BY LOCATION OF POSITION AND BY INSTITUTION
 1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

	No. of Mixed Promotions and Demotions	
	1956-1965	1966-1973
Local to National		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	1	1
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	2	4
National to Local		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	0	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	0	0
National		
Within Military	0	1
Within Party	0	0
Within Government	1	1
Between Institutions	8	9
Local		
Within Military	12	6
Within Party	1	2
Within Government	1	1
Between Institutions	24	55
National and Local		
Within Military	0	0
Within Party	3	0
Within Government	0	0
Between Institutions	5	4
Purged and Disappeared		
Within Military	5	3
Within Party	0	7
Within Government	6	1
Between Institutions	4	38
Total	73	133

Table 17

OFFICIALS WITH MIXED PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS
BY LEVEL AND NUMBER OF POSITIONS
1956-1965 AND 1966-1973

Level & No. of Positions After Promotion(s) & Demotion(s)	1956-1965		1966-1973	
	No.	%	No.	%
Higher-level & More Positions	1	1.37	37	27.82
Higher-level & Same No. of Positions	3	4.11	2	1.50
Higher-level & Fewer Positions	1	1.37	1	0.75
Same-level & More Positions	6	8.22	28	21.05
Same-level & Same No. of Positions	55	75.34	50	37.59
Same-level & Fewer Positions	5	6.85	13	9.77
Lower-level & More Positions	0	0.0	0	0.0
Lower-level & Same No. of Positions	0	0.0	0	0.0
Lower-level & Fewer Positions	2	2.74	2	1.50
Total	73		133	

Movement between military regions is limited: The data show that most leaders spend their careers in the same military regions.

Few promotions and demotions represent movement from lower-ranking to higher-ranking positions, or vice versa. Instead, judging from the limited data set of this study, promotion is the equivalent of gaining additional positions, and demotion amounts to dismissal, purge, or disappearance.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Understanding career mobility in the People's Republic of China is one way to comprehend its political system in action. Unfortunately, little research has been done, due mainly to the problem of data availability. Of course, the larger the data set the better the chance for making more reliable generalizations; and with more data, it is also essential to rely on computer manipulation of data for flexible analysis.

This study suggests that biographical analysis can be used to (1) identify and explain personnel mobility and implicitly suggest ways of identifying factions; (2) correlate personnel shifts with China's domestic political turning points and suggest ways of developing advanced warning indicators of such crises; (3) assess changing regime characteristics as a way of projecting political trends; and (4) examine career mobility patterns in the PRC political system. It is hoped that these initial efforts toward methodological inquiry will provoke constructive thinking, which, in turn, will aid further inquiry. These initial efforts are not exhaustive: The data structure and the analyses should provide future researchers with valuable raw data for the exploration of other facets of the Chinese political scene.

The major findings of this study are:

- o A relatively high purge rate is related to crisis events and decisive domestic political turning points. Therefore, a high purge rate (1 percent in this study) should be a cue to focus attention on possible changes in course and the nature of the change.
- o Since the Cultural Revolution, there has been a two-year lag between the peak of purges and the peak of new appointments. It seems to take about two years of consolidation among the competing factions before they can agree to settle on appointments. This suggests that the purge process does not eradicate

factionalism; i.e., competing factions continue to exist, and a lengthy process of bargaining and maneuver is essential before vacant positions can be filled.

- o Since 1964, purges and demotions in the marginal provinces appear to have occurred before purges and demotions in the core provinces. Thus, personnel discontinuity in the marginal provinces may be the precursor of personnel turnover in the core provinces and at the national level.
- o Civilians and military officers have risen and fallen as groups since 1956 in phase with major changes in policy and line. This suggests that changes in the relative positions of these two major groups can become an indicator of a political turning point.
- o The Cultural Revolution disrupted the relatively stable personnel continuity in the PRC; subsequent personnel shifts reveal that leaders sharing the same background (particularly of generation, civilian or military, field-army affiliation, and military-region affiliation) have collectively received promotions or demotions.
- o Long-term affiliations, such as with a field army, appear to be a significant factor identifying the competing factions and their interfactional mobility.
- o However, the substantial increase in the number of leaders whose field-army affiliations are not known may indicate that an increasing number do not have such affiliations and, consequently, a decline of field-army ties among the newly emerging elite.
- o The data underscore the relative power of insiders in military regions and the stagnation of career mobility within the military regions. This suggests the existence and importance of military-region factions.
- o The increasing representation of military regions in the top leadership also suggests that more power is now exercised at the regional level than was exercised in the period

immediately following the Communist accession to power in 1949. The Nanking, Canton, Peking, and Shenyang military regions should receive special attention.

- o The lack of different patterns between the commanders and the commissars in terms of collective promotion and demotion can be used to argue that the conflict between commanders and commissars is not as sharp as some analysts imply. Perhaps these two groups are influenced more by other factors, including the field-army and military-region affiliation, than by the competition with each other.
- o The changing regime characteristics may reflect the changing proportions of interest groups (or factions) in the top leadership group. Thus, changing ratios of field-army affiliations, military-region affiliations, insiders and outsiders, generations, civilian and military cadres, commanders and commissars, Korean War participants, and affiliations by function can be used to assess the state of the political system. For example, corroborating the evidence of increasing representation of Korean War participants, the rising representation of military managers might suggest a trend toward professionalism. However, the steady (i.e., not increasing) representation of the military technocrats suggests a predisposition to limit rapid developments of technical modernization in most conventional weapons fields. The Air Force was an exception to this pattern, gaining steadily in representation between 1956 and 1970. This gain and the subsequent decline in 1973 may reflect the close Air Force tie with Lin Piao.
- o The Second and Third field armies not only had a high rate of promotion, but as a group also gained increased representation in the top leadership in 1973. The Fourth field army obviously lost its status as the dominant field-army party following the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. Thus, the senior leaders of the Second and Third field-army parties should be closely observed and analyzed.

- o Demotion is not fatal to a political career in the PRC political system. Even officials who are purged or who disappear sometimes have the opportunity to return to power. However, when an official suffers two consecutive demotions without having been promoted, his political career seems to end.
- o Rehabilitation can become an indicator of the state of the political system. Most of the twenty-two officials rehabilitated between 1956 and 1973 came back following the fall of Lin Biao. The rehabilitation indicates the priority given to the return to civilian rule, with experienced older cadres apparently in greater demand than the young.
- o In terms of career mobility, the overall data under study show little interaction between the Center and the local level. Downward mobility from the Center to the local level is rarer than upward mobility from the local level to the Center.
- o Mobility within a military region or a province is the predominant pattern; mobility between military regions is limited, with most leaders spending their entire career in the same military region.
- o Few promotions represent movement from lower-rank positions to higher-rank positions, and few demotions represent downward movement. Rather, judging from the limited data set of this study, promotion represents appointment to additional positions, and demotion is the equivalent of dismissal, purge, or disappearance from the PRC political system. This suggests that the older, veteran cadres tend to monopolize senior positions, a situation likely to create frustration and even lack of commitment and enthusiasm among their subordinates denied opportunity.

The application of a computer to manipulate data proved to be extremely helpful in this study. The computer is particularly useful


in terms of time saving, accuracy, and encouraging explorations. To sort the biographical data on 484 leaders -- including the number of promotions and demotions, from what position(s) to what position(s), from where to where, and when, as well as their generation and field-army affiliation, whether they are civilian or military, commander or commissar, and their function, or type of position -- without the computer would have involved a great deal of time and frustration. Obviously, the use of a computer will be essential if we are to manipulate larger data sets or to explore more complicated outcomes in the future.

The use of computerized quantitative analysis should not be interpreted as denial of the value of qualitative analysis: The two broadly different analyses should support each other. In fact, the overall methodology used in this study will, it is hoped, produce findings that can persuasively confirm other analyses or challenge other findings. The methodology, including computer programs, will be able to formalize the commonly accepted assumptions and eventually become a form of validation.

Naturally, more imaginative thinking will develop more useful indicators for the policy planners. For example, which background variables best predict which attitudes under what conditions? Are all the variables presently listed sufficiently good attitudinal indicators? Might some need to be refined, and should we not add others? To the extent that different interest-group indicators do influence political outcomes, are there any guidelines for determining which are the most significant? Can we identify a range of time lag between central policy directives and the solution or implementation of these policy directives in different regions and provinces? What additional questions and hypotheses should be added in order to relate to the critical questions concerning the relationship of backgrounds and indexes of policy trends? Are these additions researchable within the framework presented? If not, how might the framework be altered? Methodology and data are the keys to the success of research. Discussions relating to these methodological questions will strengthen the empirical research on China's elites and ultimately provide better indicators of policy changes.

NOTES

1. I do not mean to imply a one-way causation: In fact, I think that the chain of personnel and policy changes are complementary and mutually interacting. Below is a simplified model that relates personnel changes to several policy areas. The two-way arrows indicate that not only do personnel changes affect policy outcome, but that policy requirements also affect personnel shifts.



2. See Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, Doubleday Company, Garden City, N.Y., 1954; also, Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "The Relationship Between Social Background Characteristics, Career Specialization, Political Attitudes, and Political Behavior Among Soviet Elites: A Research Design," paper prepared for delivery to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1973.
3. See Carl Beck et al., *Comparative Communist Political Leadership*, McKay, New York, 1973.
4. For an excellent discussion of studies on political conflict in China, see W. W. Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1091-DOS/ARPA, 1973, especially pp. 5-38, which give a broad conceptual background of major factors and their interaction in political conflict. Three major collections on Chinese political behavior are also recommended: John W. Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1970; John M.H. Lindbeck (ed.), *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1971; Frank N. Trager and William Henderson (eds.), *Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Assessment*, The New York University Press, New York, 1970.

5. See Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 53, January-March 1973, for his excellent discussion of the "dyadic tie."
6. Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2, June 1967; and Carl Beck et al., op. cit.
7. For detailed discussion of the notion of *generation*, see W. W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case," *Asian Survey*, November 1968.
8. For much more detailed charts on about 2000 leaders and a sense of the history of the field-army system, one should read William Whitson's *The Chinese High Command, 1927-71: A History of Communist Military Politics*.
9. Robert Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, University of Washington Press, 1972, pp. v-vi; Herbert J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3, September 1962, pp. 577-595.
10. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1, March 1960, p. 38; and Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography, Reflections on the Study of Leadership (1)," *The Journal of Politics*, May 1964, pp. 436-439.
11. Kuang-sheng Liao and Allen Whiting, "Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962," *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, January/March 1973.
12. Whitson, *China's Internal Politics, External Threats, and Allocations of Military Versus Propaganda Resources, 1965 to 1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1090-ARPA, January 1974.
13. Campaign attitudes can be used as indicators to define a conservative or radical. Typically, supporters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution are assumed to belong to the radical group, and those critics of these campaigns belong to the conservative group. Officials' attitudes toward other crucial issues of the pace and style of social changes can also be employed in distinguishing the radical from the conservative.
14. See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "System Attributes and Career Attributes: The Soviet Leadership System, 1952 to 1965," in Carl Beck et al., op. cit.

15. See Harry Harding, Jr., "The Making of China's Military Policy," in W. W. Whitson (ed.), *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*.
16. In 1955, Yeh Chien-ying strongly advocated more defense spending (on end items) relative to economic construction. On the other hand, Mao, in a major policy speech in 1956, advocated a larger share of total resources for nonmilitary economic investment, so that more resources for defense could become available later. I am grateful to Dr. K. C. Yeh of The Rand Corporation for bringing these sources to my attention.
17. See Jürgen Domes, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973, particularly pp. 226-229.
18. Fred von der Mehden and C. W. Anderson, "Political Action by the Developing Areas," *Social Research*, Winter 1961, pp. 459-460; Samuel P. Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 32; Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, p. 16.
19. See the author's "The Parallel Relationship Between the PLA Political Campaign and the Socialist Education Movement, 1960-1966," *Asian Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July-September 1970.
20. Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning*, The Rand Corporation, R-548-PR, February 1971.
21. William Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 56, 1973, pp. 679-684.
22. A. Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage, China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 103-104.
23. Glenn G. Dick, "The General Political Department," in William W. Whitson (ed.), *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*.
24. For a detailed analysis of regional politics, see George C. S. Sung, *China's Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach*, The Rand Corporation, P-5272, August 1974.
25. Cosmetic personnel are the following listed in Appendix 1: 6, 7, 17, 19, 21, 22, 28, 31, 34, 36, 43, 44, 47, 59, 61, 62, 63, 69, 71, 72, 78, 79, 81, 104, 116, 147, 149, 157, 159, 168, 169, 171, 172, 176, 178, 183, 197, 198, 200, 204, 207, 208, 211, 219, 220, 236, 250, 254.
26. Barnett, op. cit., pp. 233-235.

Appendix 1

LIST OF 484 LEADERS USED IN THIS STUDY

I.D.#	NAME	I.D.#	NAME
1	AN PING-SHENG	427	CHEN CHIN-YU
244	AN TZU-WEN	344	CHEN HU-CHIAO
245	CHANG CHI-CHUN	90	CHEN HSI-LIEN
436	CHANG CHIANG-LIN	91	CHEN HSIEN-JUI
396	CHANG CHIH-YANG	331	CHEN HUNG
76	CHANG CHIH-MING	334	CHEN JEN-CHI
410	CHANG CHING-YAO	92	CHEN KANG
77	CHANG CHUN-CHIAO	9	CHEN MU-HUA
387	CHANG CHUNG	449	CHEN PEI-HSIEN
442	CHANG CHUNG-LIANG	93	CHEN PO-TA
79	CHANG FU-HENG	248	CHEN SHAO-MIN
78	CHANG FU-KUEI	249	CHEN SHAO-YU
418	CHANG HAI-TANG	100	CHENG SHIH-CHING
81	CHANG HENG-YUN	94	CHEN SHIH-CHU
304	CHANG HSI-JO	250	CHEN TAN-CHIU
2	CHANG HUNG-CHIH	409	CHEN TE
374	CHANG KAI-CHING	360	CHEN TSAI-TAO
80	CHANG KUO-HUA	99	CHEN WEI-SHAN
380	CHANG LI-HSIEN	95	CHEN YI
302	CHANG NAI-CHI	96	CHEN YU
3	CHANG PING-HUA	97	CHEN YUN
303	CHANG PO-CHUN	98	CHEN YUNG-KUEI
4	CHANG SHU-CHIH	460	CHENG CHIEN
82	CHANG TA-CHIH	251	CHENG TZU-HUA
445	CHANG TE-SHENG	12	CHI PENG-FEI
83	CHANG TI-HSUEH	101	CHI TENG-KUEI
84	CHANG TIEN-YUN	444	CHIA CHI-YUN
85	CHANG TING-CHENG	252	CHIA TO-FU
86	CHANG TSAI-CHIEN	102	CHIANG CHIN
5	CHANG TSUNG-HSUN	103	CHIANG HSIEH-YUAN
6	CHANG WEI-MIN	440	CHIANG HUA
362	CHANG WEN-PI	461	CHIANG I-CHEN
246	CHANG WEN-TIEN	104	CHIANG LI-YIN
7	CHANG YEN-CHENG	306	CHIANG NAI-HSIANG
87	CHANG YI-HSIANG	443	CHIANG WEI-CHING
88	CHANG YUN-YI	399	CHIANG WEI-CHING
457	CHAO CHIEN-MIN	422	CHIANG YU-AN
397	CHAO CHUN	105	CHIANG YUNG-HUI
247	CHAO ERH-LU	10	CHIAO KUAN-HUA
382	CHAO FU-HSING	11	CHIAO LIN-I
407	CHAO HSIN-JAN	13	CHIEN CHENG-YING
404	CHAO LIN	106	CHIEN CHIH-KUANG
420	CHAO PING-LUN	365	CHIEN CHUN
458	CHAO PO-PING	307	CHIEN HSIN CHUNG
459	CHAO SHOU-SHAN	253	CHIEN YING
8	CHAO TZU-YANG	14	CHIN CHI-WEI
395	CHEN CHANG-FENG	254	CHIN PANG-HSIEN
305	CHEN CHENG-JEN	15	CHIN TSU-MIN
89	CHEN CHI-HAN	107	CHIU CHUANG-CHENG
386	CHEN CHI-TE	108	CHIU HUI-TSO

I.D.#	NAME	I.D.#	NAME
109	CHIU KUO-KUANG	364	HSIUNG YING-TANG
110	CHOU CHIEN-JEN	123	HSU CHING-HSIEN
111	CHOU CHIH-PING	125	HSU HAI-TUNG
16	CHOU CHUN-LIN	124	HSU HSIANG-CHIEN
441	CHOU HSHAO-CHOU	330	HSU KUO-CHEN
113	CHOU HSING	126	HSU SHIH-YU
17	CHOU HUNG-PAO	259	HSU TE-LI
366	CHOU KUAN-WU	465	HU CHAO-HENG
18	CHOU LI-CHIN	127	HU CHI-TSUNG
416	CHOU LIN	261	HU CHIAO-MU
112	CHOU EN-LAI	269	HSU KUANG-TA
19	CHU CHIA-YAO	433	HU PING-YUN
345	CHU MING	262	HU YAO-PANG
20	CHU MU-CHIN	128	HUA KUD-FENG
423	CHU SHENG-TA	30	HUA LIN-SH
114	CHU TEH	398	HUANG CHAO-TIEN
368	CHU YAO-HUA	129	HUANG CHEN
21	CHUANG TSE-TUNG	332	HUANG CHIH-YUNG
463	DE LAI LAMA	431	HUANG CHING-YAO
462	FAN CHIH-CHUN	348	HUANG HSIN-TING
22	FAN TE-LING	29	HUANG HUA
308	FAN TZU-YU	448	HUANG HUO-CHING
310	FANG CHIANG	408	HUANG JUNG-HAI
23	FANG I	263	HUANG KE-CHENG
24	FENG HSUAN	343	HUANG WEN-MING
25	FU CHUAN-TSO	464	HUANG YEN
309	FU TSO-I	130	HUANG YUNG-SHENG
117	HAN HSIEN-CHU	466	HUI YU-YU
385	HAN TUNG-SHAN	447	HUB SHIH-LIEN
26	HAN YING	31	ISMAYILAYMAT
419	HO CHING-CHI	357	JEN JUNG
411	HO KUANG-YU	132	JEN SU-CHUNG
255	HO LUNG	421	KANG CHIEN-MIN
349	HO PING-YEN	133	KANG SHENG
402	HO YU-FA	134	KAO WEI-SUNG
256	HSI CHANG-HSUN	32	KENG CHI-CHANG
116	HSIA PANG-YIN	135	KENG PIAO
333	HSIANG CHUNG-HUA	264	KO CHING-SHII
118	HSIAO CHING-KUANG	33	KU MU
257	HSIAO HUA	136	KUANG JEN-NUNG
258	HSIAO KO	34	KUNG CHAO-NIEN
355	HSIAO SZU-MIN	137	KUNG SHIH-CHUAN
446	HSIEH CHEN-HUA	373	KUD CHIANG
120	HSIEH CHIA-HSIANG	35	KUD HUNG-CHIEH
27	HSIEH CHING-I	138	KUD MO-JO
119	HSIEH FU-CHIH	352	KUD PENG
121	HSIEH HSUEH-KUNG	467	KUD YING-CHIU
122	HSIEN HENG-HAN	36	KUD YU-FENG
383	HSIN CHUN-CHIEH	139	LAI CHI-FA
28	HSING YEN-TZU	414	LAN I-WUNG

I.D.#	NAME	I.D.#	NAME
140	LI CHEN	156	LIU CHIEN-HSUN
468	LI CHI-MING	369	LIU CHIEN-TING
141	LI CHIANG	340	LIU CHIN-PING
37	LI CHIH-MIN	157	LIU CHUN-YI
38	LI CHING-CHUAN	158	LIU FENG
311	LI CHU-CHEN	159	LIU HSI-CHANG
329	LI CHU-KUEI	45	LIU HSIANG-PING
470	LI FAN-WU	272	LIU HSIAO
142	LI FU-CHUN	160	LIU HSIEN-CHUAN
439	LI HSI-FU	400	LIU HSIEN-SHENG
143	LI HSIEN-NIEN	161	LIU HSING-YUAN
144	LI HSUEH-FENG	315	LIU HSIU-FENG
39	LI JENG-CHIH	162	LIU KE-PING
145	LI JUI-SHAN	273	LIU LAN-TAO
265	LI KE-NUNG	274	LIU NING-I
469	LI KENG-TAO	163	LIU PO-CHENG
472	LI LI	275	LIU SHAO-CHI
266	LI LI-SAN	164	LIU SHENG-TIEN
40	LI PAO-HUA	425	LIU SHIH-HUNG
338	LI SHOU-HSUAN	165	LIU TZU-HOU
438	LI SHU-MOU	166	LIU WEI
146	LI SHUI-CHING	316	LIU WEN-HUI
147	LI SHUN-TA	276	LIU YA-LOU
148	LI SU-KUANG	317	LIU YU-MIN
149	LI SU-WEN	371	LIU YUNG-SHENG
41	LI TA	46	LO CHING-CHANG
417	LI TAO-CHIH	47	LO HSI-KANG
312	LI TE-CHUAN	346	LO HUA-SHENG
151	LI TE-SHENG	277	LO JUI-CHING
152	LI TIEN-YU	278	LO JUNG-HUAN
412	LI TSAI-HAN	403	LO KUN-SHAN
153	LI TSO-PENG	280	LU CHENG-TSAO
267	LI WEI-HAN	167	LU JUI-LIN
471	LI YU-WEN	370	LU SHENG
43	LIANG CHIN-TANG	150	LU TA-CHANG
154	LIANG HSING-CHU	168	LU TIEN-CHI
389	LIANG JEN-CHIEH	279	LU TING-I
42	LIAO CHENG-CHIN	169	LU YU-LAN
450	LIAO CHIH-KAO	388	LUNG PING-CHU
363	LIAO JUNG-PIAO	170	LUNG SHU-CHIN
313	LIAO LU-YEN	171	MA FU-CHUAN
268	LIN FENG	376	MA HUI
44	LIN LI-YUN	281	MA MING-FANG
75	LIN PIAO	48	MA NING
269	LIN PO-CHU	49	MA TIEN-SHUI
270	LIN TIEH	318	MA WEN-JUI
367	LIN WEI-HSIEN	74	MAO TSE-THUNG
271	LIU CHANG-SHENG	172	MO HSIEN-YAO
314	LIU CHIEH	173	NAN PING
155	LIU CHIEH-TING	174	NI CHIH-FU

I.D.#	NAME	I.D.#	NAME
372	NI NAN-SHAN	131	TAO HSING-LI
175	NIEH JUNG-CHEN	191	TENG HAI-CHING
176	NIEN CHI-JUNG	57	TENG HSIAO-PING
434	NIU SHU-SHEN	290	TENG HUA
405	OU CHIN-FU	394	TENG KO-MING
282	OU-YANGCHIN	481	TENG PAO-SHAW
50	PA SANG	347	TENG SHAO-TUNG
319	PAI HSIANG-KUO	192	TENG TAI-YUAN
51	PAI JU-PING	189	TENG TZU-HUI
177	PAN FU-SHENG	190	TENG YING-CHAO
179	PAN SHIH-KAO	193	TIEN HUA-KUEI
115	PAN WEN-LAN	194	TIEN PAO
178	PAOJIHLETAI	58	TIEN WEI-HSIN
283	PENG CHEN	415	TIEN WEI-YANG
180	PENG SHAO-HUI	59	TING KUO-TSE
284	PENG TE-HUAI	60	TING KUO-YU
375	PI CHAN-YUN	195	TING SHENG
181	PI TING-CHUN	196	TSAI CHANG
285	PO I-PO	61	TSAI HSIAO
182	SAIFUDIN	197	TSAI HSIEH-PIN
320	SHA CHIEN-LI	198	TSAI SHU-MEI
322	SHA FENG	426	TSAO CHUNG-NAN
474	SHA WEN-HAN	199	TSAO LI-HUAI
473	SHAO SHIH-PING	200	TSAO YI-OU
451	SHE CHI-TE	62	TSEN KUO-JUNG
183	SHEN MAO-KUNG	291	TSENG HSI-SHENG
321	SHEN YEN-PING	201	TSENG KUO-HUA
413	SHIH HSIN-AN	377	TSENG MEI
286	SHU TUNG	202	TSENG SHAN
52	SU CHEN-HUA	203	TSENG SHAO-SHAN
184	SU CHING	205	TSENG SU-YU
185	SU YU	356	TSENG YUNG-YA
323	SUN CHIH-YUAN	63	TSUI HAI-LUNG
324	SUN TA-KUANG	339	TSUI TIEN-MIN
475	SUN TSO-PIN	204	TSUNG HSI-YUN
437	SUNG CHANG-KENG	476	TU CHE-HUNG
287	SUNG JEN-CHUNG	206	TU PING
53	SUNG PEI-CHANG	64	TUAN CHUN-I
337	SUNG WEI-SHIH	401	TUAN HUAN-CHIN
56	TA LU-CHIA	429	TUNG KUO-KUFI
54	TAN CHEN-LIN	297	TUNG MING-HUI
288	TAN CHENG	209	TUNG PI-WU
55	TAN CHI-LUNG	65	ULANFU
186	TAN FU-JEN	453	WAN HSIAD-TANG
358	TAN KUAN-SAN	480	WANG CHAO
187	TANG CHI-SHAN	208	WANG CHAO-CHU
430	TANG CHIEN-JU	210	WANG CHEN
188	TANG CHUNG-FU	66	WANG CHENG
353	TANG LIANG	67	WANG CHIA-HSIANG
289	TAO CHU	478	WANG CHIEN

I.D.#	NAME	I.D.#	NAME
211	WANG CHIN-HSI	384	WU SHIH-AN
292	WANG EN-MAO	232	WU TA-SHENG
391	WANG FENG	233	WU TAO
325	WANG HE-SHOU	234	WU TE
212	WANG HSIAO-YU	297	WU YU-CHANG
213	WANG HSIN-TING	354	YANG CHENG-WU
214	WANG HSIU-CHEN	435	YANG CHIA-JUI
215	WANG HUAI-HSIANG	326	YANG CHIEH
216	WANG HUI-CHIU	456	YANG CHIH-LIN
217	WANG HUNG-KUN	424	YANG CHING-JEN
218	WANG HUNG-WEN	455	YANG CHING-JEN
361	WANG JEN-CHUNG	235	YANG CHUN-FU
219	WANG KUO-FAN	335	YANG CHUN-SHENG
359	WANG LIU-SHENG	236	YANG FU-CHEN
220	WANG PAI-TAN	298	YANG HSIEN-CHEN
68	WANG PI-CHENG	299	YANG HSIU-FENG
221	WANG PING-CHANG	381	YANG MEI-SHENG
479	WANG SHIH-YING	454	YANG SHANG-KUEI
222	WANG SHOU-TAO	300	YANG SHANG-KUN
69	WANG SHU-CHEN	379	YANG TA-I
223	WANG SHU-SHENG	237	YANG TE-CHIH
378	WANG TAO-PANG	392	YANG TUNG-LIANG
293	WANG TSUNG-WU	70	YANG YUNG
224	WANG TUNG-HSING	328	YAO I-LIN
428	WANG TZU-FENG	238	YAO WEN-YUAN
294	WANG WEI-CHOU	301	YEH CHI-CHUANG
477	WEI CHIN-SHUI	239	YEH CHIEN-YING
225	WEI FENG-YING	240	YEH CHUN
452	WEI HENG	350	YEH FEI
226	WEI KUO-CHING	351	YEN HUNG-YEN
227	WEI PING-KUEI	342	YU CHING-SHAN
406	WEI TZU-CHEN	241	YU CHIU-LI
484	WEN MIN-SHENG	72	YU HUI-YUNG
228	WEN YU-CHENG	71	YU HUNG-LIANG
295	WU CHIH-PU	482	YU I-CHUAN
229	WU FA-HSIEN	330	YU LI-CHIN
296	WU HSIU-CHUAN	242	YU SANG
230	WU JUI-LIN	73	YU TAI-CHUNG
393	WU JUI-SHAN	432	YUAN KO-FU
336	WU KO-HUA	327	YUAN PAO-HUA
231	WU KUEI-HSIEN	243	YUAN SHENG-PING
341	WU LIEH	483	YUN JEN-YUAN

Appendix 2

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY FIELD-ARMY AFFILIATION, 1956-1973

Year	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6 ^a	UNK ^b	TOT ^c
1956	27	42	39	30	29	49	5	221
1957	30	43	42	35	30	49	3	232
1958	34	51	46	44	32	51	4	262
1959	32	53	49	46	34	52	3	269
1960	32	50	48	48	37	52	3	270
1961	33	50	51	47	34	52	2	269
1962	34	50	51	47	36	51	3	272
1963	35	52	52	47	35	52	2	275
1964	38	57	52	54	33	52	2	288
1965	41	63	56	56	33	52	2	303
1966	40	63	51	56	25	45	2	282
1967	22	51	46	40	20	28	2	209
1968	19	47	39	50	22	26	2	205
1969	25	54	49	62	32	32	16	270
1970	23	49	51	58	28	31	16	256
1971	22	47	50	39	29	28	19	234
1972	23	46	49	38	29	26	20	231
1973	24	50	49	37	30	35	37	262

^aThe central Party, government, and military establishment.

^bThe number of officials who held positions included in this study (see Section II-C, pp. 19-22) in the year indicated whose field-army affiliation is not known.

^cThe total number of officials who held positions included in this study in the year indicated.

Appendix 3

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED PROMOTION DISTRIBUTION BY FIELD ARMY, 1956-1973

Year	Actual								Expected								Deviation							
	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	TOT	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	TOT	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1957	5	3	9	8	1	1	0	27	3	5	4	4	3	5	0	24	2	-2	5	4	-2	-4	0	
1958	11	16	12	15	10	6	2	72	9	14	12	12	8	14	1	70	2	2	0	3	2	-8	1	
1959	4	7	7	5	7	5	0	35	4	6	6	5	4	6	0	31	0	1	1	0	3	-1	0	
1960	4	3	2	7	3	5	1	25	2	4	4	4	3	4	0	21	2	-1	-2	3	0	1	1	
1961	4	2	7	6	1	0	0	20	2	3	3	3	2	3	0	16	2	-1	4	3	-1	-3	0	
1962	4	4	3	4	3	2	2	22	2	4	4	3	2	4	0	19	2	0	-1	1	1	-2	2	
1963	3	4	2	7	1	2	0	19	2	3	3	3	2	3	0	16	1	1	-1	4	-1	-1	0	
1964	5	13	4	8	0	4	0	34	4	6	6	6	3	6	0	31	1	7	-2	2	-3	-2	0	
1965	5	17	13	11	4	4	1	55	7	11	10	10	5	9	0	52	-2	6	3	1	-1	-5	1	
1966	4	5	7	4	2	2	0	24	3	5	4	4	2	3	0	21	1	0	3	0	0	-1	0	
1967	3	10	5	9	12	1	1	41	4	10	9	7	3	5	0	38	-1	0	-4	2	9	-4	1	
1968	5	20	13	33	11	3	1	86	7	19	16	20	9	10	0	81	-2	1	-3	13	2	-7	1	
1969	17	39	32	57	23	16	18	202	18	40	36	46	23	23	11	197	-1	-1	-4	11	0	-7	7	
1970	4	5	10	10	1	3	3	36	3	6	7	8	3	4	2	33	1	-1	3	2	-2	-1	1	
1971	4	26	27	13	17	1	8	96	9	19	20	15	11	11	7	92	-5	7	7	-2	6	-10	1	
1972	2	7	9	3	2	1	2	26	2	5	5	4	3	2	2	23	0	2	4	-1	-1	-1	0	
1973	16	26	25	12	9	21	27	136	12	25	25	19	15	18	19	133	4	1	0	-7	-6	3	8	

Appendix 4

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED DEMOTION DISTRIBUTION BY FIELD ARMY, 1956-1973

Year	Actual								Expected								Deviation							
	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	TOT	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	TOT	FA1	FA2	FA3	FA4	FA5	FA6	UNK	
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	0	4	5	0	0	0	2	11	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	8	-1	2	4	-1	-1	-2	2	
1958	4	1	5	3	3	2	1	19	2	3	3	2	2	4	0	16	2	-2	2	1	1	-2	1	
1959	6	5	0	5	5	3	1	25	3	4	4	4	3	4	0	22	3	1	-4	1	2	-1	1	
1960	7	5	4	5	1	2	1	25	2	4	4	4	3	4	0	21	5	1	0	1	-2	-2	1	
1961	0	3	3	6	3	0	1	16	1	2	2	2	2	3	0	12	-1	1	1	4	1	-3	1	
1962	2	0	1	3	0	3	0	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	-1	0	2	-1	2	0	
1963	3	3	0	5	1	0	2	14	1	2	2	2	1	2	0	10	2	1	-2	3	0	-2	2	
1964	2	0	2	0	2	2	0	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	0	
1965	3	3	3	5	8	3	1	26	3	5	4	4	2	4	0	22	0	-2	-1	1	6	-1	1	
1966	3	3	9	4	20	12	0	51	6	10	9	9	5	8	0	47	-3	-7	0	-5	15	4	0	
1967	34	37	21	36	26	36	2	192	27	42	34	38	17	30	1	189	7	-5	-13	-2	9	6	1	
1968	15	32	35	10	8	6	2	108	11	26	23	20	10	14	1	105	4	6	12	-10	-2	-8	1	
1969	1	2	8	4	3	2	0	20	1	4	3	4	2	2	0	16	0	-2	5	0	1	0	0	
1970	4	8	3	11	9	2	1	38	3	7	6	8	4	4	2	34	1	1	-3	3	5	-2	-1	
1971	3	10	6	42	4	9	0	74	6	14	14	16	8	8	4	70	-3	-4	-8	26	-4	1	-4	
1972	1	6	9	7	1	5	1	30	2	6	6	4	3	3	2	26	-1	0	3	3	-2	2	-1	
1973	3	13	9	9	1	2	0	37	3	7	7	6	4	4	3	34	0	6	2	3	-3	-2	-3	

Appendix 5

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY GENERATION, 1956-1973

Year	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK ^a TOT	
	Average Age in 1973						
	68	64	60	58	52-		
1956	130	42	9	2	5	33	221
1957	133	46	14	2	5	32	232
1958	138	56	20	2	9	37	262
1959	137	59	21	2	10	40	269
1960	134	63	22	2	9	40	270
1961	135	63	23	2	9	37	269
1962	135	64	25	2	7	39	272
1963	134	69	25	2	6	39	275
1964	134	69	35	2	7	41	288
1965	131	76	43	4	7	42	303
1966	115	74	44	3	6	40	282
1967	78	62	39	2	8	20	209
1968	61	60	47	6	9	22	205
1969	64	61	54	6	14	71	270
1970	61	57	51	5	13	69	256
1971	53	44	44	7	11	75	234
1972	51	44	43	5	11	77	231
1973	59	42	42	5	12	102	262

^aThe number of officials who held positions included in this study in the year indicated whose generation is not known.

Appendix 6

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED PROMOTION DISTRIBUTION BY GENERATION, 1956-1973

Year	Actual							Expected							Deviation					
	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK	TOT	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK	TOT	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	7	6	7	0	1	6	27	15	5	1	0	0	3	24	-8	1	6	0	1	3
1958	26	14	7	1	5	19	72	37	15	5	0	2	10	69	-11	-1	2	1	3	9
1959	16	9	1	0	1	8	35	17	7	2	0	1	5	32	-1	2	-1	0	0	3
1960	7	10	5	0	0	3	25	12	5	2	0	0	3	22	-5	5	3	0	0	0
1961	9	5	2	0	1	3	20	10	4	1	0	0	2	17	-1	1	1	0	1	1
1962	7	4	3	0	0	8	22	10	5	2	0	0	3	20	-3	-1	1	0	0	5
1963	6	8	1	0	0	4	19	9	4	1	0	0	2	16	-3	4	0	0	0	2
1964	8	5	12	0	1	8	34	15	8	4	0	0	4	31	-7	-3	8	0	1	4
1965	10	18	14	2	1	10	55	23	13	7	0	1	7	51	-13	5	7	2	0	3
1966	4	8	7	0	0	5	24	9	6	3	0	0	3	21	-5	2	4	0	0	2
1967	6	14	15	0	3	3	41	15	12	7	0	1	3	38	-9	2	8	0	2	0
1968	8	25	34	7	2	10	86	25	25	19	2	3	9	83	-17	0	15	5	-1	1
1969	33	41	47	5	10	66	202	47	45	40	4	10	53	199	-14	-4	7	1	0	13
1970	7	3	10	2	1	13	36	8	8	7	0	1	9	33	-1	-5	3	2	0	4
1971	13	17	26	3	4	33	96	21	18	18	2	4	30	93	-8	-1	8	1	0	3
1972	4	5	5	2	0	10	26	5	4	4	0	1	8	22	-1	1	1	2	-1	2
1973	28	11	10	2	6	79	136	30	21	21	2	6	52	132	-2	-10	-11	0	0	27

Appendix 7

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED DEMOTION DISTRIBUTION BY GENERATION, 1956-1973

Year	Actual							Expected							Deviation						
	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK	TOT	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK	TOT	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5+	UNK	TOT
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	3	1	0	0	0	7	11	6	2	0	0	0	1	9	-3	-1	0	0	0	6	2
1958	8	1	0	0	0	10	19	10	3	1	0	0	2	16	-2	-2	-1	0	0	8	3
1959	13	4	1	1	0	6	25	13	5	1	0	0	3	22	0	-1	0	1	0	3	3
1960	15	6	2	0	1	1	25	12	5	1	0	0	3	21	3	1	1	0	1	-2	4
1961	10	2	0	0	0	4	16	7	3	1	0	0	2	13	3	-1	-1	0	0	2	3
1962	2	2	1	0	2	2	9	4	2	0	0	0	1	7	-2	0	1	0	2	1	2
1963	8	0	1	0	1	4	14	6	3	1	0	0	2	12	2	-3	0	0	1	2	2
1964	4	3	0	0	0	1	8	3	2	0	0	0	1	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
1965	15	3	3	0	0	5	26	12	6	3	0	0	3	24	3	-3	0	0	0	2	2
1966	33	7	3	3	1	4	51	22	12	7	0	1	7	49	11	-5	-4	3	0	-3	2
1967	92	30	18	1	1	50	192	78	50	29	2	4	27	190	14	-20	-11	-1	-3	23	2
1968	45	24	13	0	2	24	108	40	32	20	1	4	10	107	5	-8	-7	-1	-2	14	1
1969	10	7	3	0	0	0	20	5	5	4	0	0	2	16	5	2	-1	0	0	-2	4
1970	9	10	11	4	1	3	38	9	8	7	0	1	9	34	0	2	4	4	0	-6	4
1971	22	28	17	0	2	5	74	17	16	14	1	3	19	70	5	12	3	-1	-1	-14	4
1972	5	7	6	9	0	3	30	6	5	5	0	1	9	26	-1	2	1	9	-1	-6	4
1973	6	14	11	2	0	4	37	8	7	6	0	1	12	34	-2	7	5	2	-1	-8	3

Appendix 8

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED PROMOTION DISTRIBUTION
FOR CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY LEADERS, 1956-1973

Year	No. of Leaders				N o . o f P r o m o t i o n s											
					Actual				Expected				Deviation			
	CIV	MIL	UNK ^a	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	
1956	125	94	2	221	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1957	126	105	1	232	9	17	1	27	14	12	0	26	-5	5	1	
1958	139	121	2	262	45	26	1	72	38	33	0	71	7	-7	1	
1959	142	126	1	269	12	23	0	35	18	16	0	34	-6	7	0	
1960	139	130	1	270	8	17	0	25	12	12	0	24	-4	5	0	
1961	136	132	1	269	8	12	0	20	10	9	0	19	-2	3	0	
1962	137	134	1	272	14	8	0	22	11	10	0	21	3	-2	0	
1963	135	139	1	275	5	14	0	19	9	9	0	18	-4	5	0	
1964	137	150	1	288	13	21	0	34	16	17	0	33	-3	4	0	
1965	137	164	2	303	21	33	1	55	24	29	0	53	-3	4	1	
1966	121	159	2	282	10	13	1	24	10	13	0	23	0	0	1	
1967	66	142	1	209	9	32	0	41	12	27	0	39	-3	5	0	
1968	56	147	2	205	19	66	1	86	23	61	0	84	-4	5	1	
1969	103	162	5	270	87	111	4	202	77	121	3	201	10	-10	1	
1970	98	154	4	256	13	23	0	36	13	21	0	34	0	2	0	
1971	97	133	4	234	31	64	1	96	39	54	1	94	-8	10	0	
1972	96	131	4	231	12	14	0	26	10	14	0	24	2	0	0	
1973	116	135	11	262	80	48	8	136	60	70	5	135	20	-22	3	

^aThe number of officials who held positions included in this study in the year indicated whose military or civilian status is not known.

Appendix 9

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED DEMOTION DISTRIBUTION
FOR CIVILIAN VS. MILITARY LEADERS, 1956-1973

Year	No. of Leaders				No. of Demotions											
					Actual				Expected				Deviation			
	CIV	MIL	UNK ^a	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	TOT	CIV	MIL	UNK	TOT
1956	125	94	2	221	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	126	105	1	232	8	1	2	11	5	4	0	10	2	-3	2	1
1958	139	121	2	262	17	2	0	19	10	8	0	18	7	-6	0	1
1959	142	126	1	269	14	10	1	25	13	11	0	24	1	-1	1	1
1960	139	130	1	270	13	12	0	25	13	11	0	24	0	1	0	1
1961	136	132	1	269	7	9	0	16	8	7	0	15	-1	2	0	1
1962	137	134	1	272	3	6	0	9	4	4	0	8	-1	2	0	1
1963	135	139	1	275	8	6	0	14	7	6	0	13	1	0	0	1
1964	137	150	1	288	4	4	0	8	3	4	0	7	1	0	0	1
1965	137	164	2	303	14	12	0	26	12	13	0	25	2	-1	0	1
1966	121	159	2	282	33	18	0	51	23	27	0	50	10	-9	0	1
1967	68	142	1	209	137	54	1	192	82	108	1	191	55	-54	0	1
1968	56	147	2	205	67	41	0	108	34	73	0	107	33	-32	0	1
1969	103	162	5	270	7	13	0	20	5	14	0	19	2	-1	0	1
1970	98	154	4	256	10	27	1	38	14	22	0	36	-4	5	1	1
1971	97	133	4	234	15	59	0	74	28	44	1	73	-13	15	-1	1
1972	96	131	4	231	8	22	0	30	12	17	0	29	-4	5	0	1
1973	116	135	11	262	9	28	0	37	15	20	0	35	-6	8	0	1

^aThe number of officials who held positions included in this study in the year indicated whose military or civilian status is not known.

Appendix 10

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED PROMOTION DISTRIBUTION
FOR COMMISSARS VS. COMMANDERS, 1956-1973

Year	No. of Leaders					No. of Promotions													
						Actual					Expected					Deviation			
	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK
1956	19	60	11	4	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	20	67	14	4	105	3	11	3	0	17	3	10	2	0	15	0	1	1	0
1958	24	77	15	5	121	8	13	2	2	25	4	15	3	1	23	4	-2	-1	1
1959	24	81	16	5	126	4	14	4	0	22	4	14	2	0	20	0	0	2	0
1960	27	84	15	4	130	3	12	2	1	18	3	11	2	0	16	0	1	0	1
1961	28	84	15	5	132	3	6	1	2	12	2	7	1	0	10	1	-1	0	2
1962	27	87	15	5	134	0	7	0	0	7	1	4	0	0	5	-1	3	0	0
1963	27	91	17	5	140	5	7	2	0	14	2	9	1	0	12	3	-2	1	0
1964	31	96	18	6	151	7	10	2	1	20	4	12	2	0	18	3	-2	0	1
1965	40	101	17	6	164	13	13	4	1	31	7	19	3	1	30	6	-6	1	0
1966	40	99	17	3	159	5	7	1	0	13	3	8	1	0	12	2	-1	0	0
1967	37	89	14	2	142	16	14	2	0	32	8	20	3	0	31	8	-6	-1	0
1968	37	96	12	2	147	18	44	4	0	66	16	43	5	0	64	2	1	-1	0
1969	43	101	13	5	162	37	61	6	6	110	29	68	8	3	108	8	-7	-2	3
1970	39	97	12	6	154	6	14	1	1	22	5	13	1	0	19	1	1	0	1
1971	33	82	10	8	133	23	33	1	5	62	15	38	4	3	60	8	-5	-3	2
1972	34	80	9	8	131	6	3	1	2	12	3	7	0	0	10	3	-4	1	2
1973	34	85	7	9	135	10	34	1	1	46	11	28	2	3	44	-1	6	-1	-2

Appendix 11

ACTUAL, EXPECTED, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED DEMOTION DISTRIBUTION
FOR COMMISSARS VS. COMMANDERS, 1956-1973

Year	No. of Leaders					No. of Demotions													
						Actual					Expected					Deviation			
	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK	TOT	CSR	CDR	BOTH	UNK
1956	19	60	11	4	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	20	67	14	4	105	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1958	24	77	15	5	121	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
1959	24	81	16	5	126	3	4	1	1	9	1	5	1	0	7	2	-1	0	1
1960	27	84	15	4	130	0	7	4	2	13	2	8	1	0	11	-2	-1	3	2
1961	28	84	15	5	132	3	5	0	1	9	1	5	1	0	7	2	0	-1	1
1962	27	87	15	5	134	1	5	0	0	6	1	3	0	0	4	0	2	0	0
1963	27	91	17	5	140	2	2	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
1964	31	96	18	6	151	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
1965	40	101	17	6	164	4	2	5	1	12	2	7	1	0	10	2	-5	4	1
1966	40	99	17	3	159	2	8	3	5	18	4	11	1	0	16	-2	-3	2	5
1967	37	89	14	2	142	18	27	7	2	54	13	33	5	1	52	5	-6	2	1
1968	37	96	12	2	147	20	12	9	0	41	10	25	4	0	39	10	-13	5	0
1969	43	101	13	5	162	1	9	3	0	13	3	8	1	0	12	-2	1	2	0
1970	39	97	12	6	154	9	13	2	0	24	6	14	1	0	21	3	-1	1	0
1971	33	82	10	8	133	18	35	5	0	58	14	36	4	2	56	4	-1	1	-2
1972	34	80	9	8	131	7	8	4	1	20	4	12	1	1	18	3	-4	3	0
1973	34	85	7	9	135	9	9	8	0	26	6	15	1	1	23	3	-6	7	-1

Appendix 12

DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a														TOT
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK		
1956	57	3	12	3	4	8	24	21	22	13	10	31	13	221	
1957	64	3	14	4	4	8	22	22	22	13	10	33	13	232	
1958	75	4	16	5	4	8	24	25	23	14	10	37	17	262	
1959	76	4	19	6	4	8	24	26	23	14	12	37	16	269	
1960	80	5	18	6	4	9	24	26	22	15	11	36	14	270	
1961	78	5	19	6	4	9	22	26	22	16	12	35	15	269	
1962	82	5	17	5	5	9	23	26	23	16	11	35	15	272	
1963	86	5	17	6	4	9	23	27	22	16	12	34	14	275	
1964	94	5	20	5	5	10	23	27	22	15	14	34	14	288	
1965	106	6	20	6	5	14	23	25	22	14	13	32	17	303	
1966	105	6	19	6	5	12	14	23	19	14	13	29	17	282	
1967	98	5	17	6	3	7	8	15	11	8	5	16	10	209	
1968	103	5	19	7	4	5	7	15	6	5	8	14	7	205	
1969	110	5	20	9	4	6	13	18	6	6	39	18	16	270	
1970	102	5	19	9	4	5	13	17	6	5	37	18	16	256	
1971	93	3	15	4	3	6	13	16	7	6	36	15	17	234	
1972	91	3	14	3	4	7	12	16	5	6	36	15	19	231	
1973	91	3	15	4	4	9	14	15	8	12	38	16	33	262	
Total	1591	80	310	100	74	149	326	386	291	208	327	485	283	4610	

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security
 02 - Artillery, Engineers, & 2d Arty (missiles)
 03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear
 04 - Air Force
 05 - Navy
 06 - General Political Department

07 - Propaganda & Education
 08 - Industry & Communications
 09 - Finance & Trade
 10 - Foreign Affairs
 11 - Agriculture & Forestry
 12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 13

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL PROMOTIONS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a													
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	TOT
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	8	1	4	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	4	4	27
1958	15	1	2	1	1	3	6	7	7	2	3	16	8	72
1959	14	0	3	1	0	2	4	2	1	0	3	1	4	35
1960	11	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	0	2	0	25
1961	4	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	2	4	3	20
1962	7	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	3	0	2	1	3	22
1963	8	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	0	19
1964	14	0	3	0	1	2	0	5	1	1	4	2	1	34
1965	23	1	3	4	0	4	3	3	2	0	2	3	7	55
1966	11	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	2	4	24
1967	24	0	3	1	0	4	1	0	0	0	1	7	0	41
1968	51	2	7	4	1	2	2	5	0	0	5	6	1	86
1969	66	5	16	10	3	5	11	8	3	2	39	18	16	202
1970	15	0	4	0	0	1	3	4	0	0	1	4	4	36
1971	52	1	3	0	0	4	7	4	2	1	2	13	7	96
1972	9	0	1	0	1	3	3	0	0	1	1	4	3	26
1973	33	0	6	3	1	7	13	7	8	13	14	8	23	136
Total	365	12	61	26	12	42	61	51	34	23	84	97	88	956

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security
 02 - Artillery, Engineers, & 2d Arty (missiles)
 03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear
 04 - Air Force
 05 - Navy
 06 - General Political Department

07 - Propaganda & Education
 08 - Industry & Communications
 09 - Finance & Trade
 10 - Foreign Affairs
 11 - Agriculture & Forestry
 12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 14

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPECTED PROMOTIONS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a													TOT
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	7	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	20
1958	20	1	4	1	1	2	6	6	6	3	2	10	4	66
1959	9	0	2	0	0	1	3	3	2	1	1	4	2	28
1960	7	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	20
1961	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	13
1962	6	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	15
1963	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	12
1964	11	0	2	0	0	1	2	3	2	1	1	4	1	28
1965	19	1	3	1	0	2	4	4	3	2	2	5	3	49
1966	8	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	18
1967	19	0	3	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	0	3	1	34
1968	43	2	7	2	1	2	2	6	2	2	3	5	2	79
1969	82	3	14	6	2	4	9	13	4	4	29	13	11	194
1970	14	0	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	5	2	2	29
1971	38	1	6	1	1	2	5	6	2	2	14	6	6	90
1972	10	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	1	2	20
1973	47	1	7	2	2	4	7	7	4	6	19	8	17	131
Total	350	9	57	15	7	20	49	62	35	28	83	75	56	846

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security | 07 - Propaganda & Education |
| 02 - Artillery, Engineers, 2d Arty (missiles) | 08 - Industry & Communications |
| 03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear | 09 - Finance & Trade |
| 04 - Air Force | 10 - Foreign Affairs |
| 05 - Navy | 11 - Agriculture & Forestry |
| 06 - General Political Department | 12 - Political & Personnel |

Appendix 15

DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED PROMOTION DISTRIBUTION BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a													
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	TOT
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	1	1	3	1	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-1	2	1	3	7
1958	-5	0	-2	0	0	1	0	1	1	-1	1	6	4	6
1959	5	0	1	1	0	1	1	-1	-1	-1	2	-3	2	7
1960	4	1	0	0	1	1	0	-1	1	1	-1	-1	-1	5
1961	-1	0	1	0	0	1	-1	1	0	0	2	2	2	7
1962	1	0	-1	0	2	0	3	-2	2	-1	2	-1	2	7
1963	3	0	1	1	1	1	-1	0	0	-1	2	0	0	7
1964	3	0	1	0	1	1	-2	2	-1	0	3	-2	0	6
1965	4	0	0	3	0	2	-1	-1	-1	-2	0	-2	4	6
1966	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	-1	-1	0	3	6
1967	5	0	0	0	0	3	0	-2	-2	-1	1	4	-1	7
1968	8	0	0	2	0	0	0	-1	-2	-2	2	1	-1	7
1969	16	2	2	4	1	1	2	-5	-1	-2	10	5	5	8
1970	1	0	2	-1	0	1	2	2	0	0	-4	2	2	7
1971	14	0	-3	-1	-1	2	2	-2	0	-1	-12	7	1	6
1972	-1	0	0	0	1	3	2	-1	0	1	-3	3	1	6
1973	-14	-1	-1	1	-1	3	6	0	4	7	-5	0	6	5
Total	15	3	4	11	5	22	12	-11	-1	-5	1	22	32	110

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security	07 - Propaganda & Education
02 - Artillery, Engineers, 2d Arty (missiles)	08 - Industry & Communications
03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear	09 - Finance & Trade
04 - Air Force	10 - Foreign Affairs
05 - Navy	11 - Agriculture & Forestry
06 - General Political Department	12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 16

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL DEMOTIONS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

	F u n c t i o n ^a													
Year	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	TOT
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	4	11
1958	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	0	5	5	0	19
1959	9	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	1	0	3	3	3	25
1960	5	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	5	2	2	3	5	25
1961	4	0	2	0	0	2	3	2	1	0	0	2	0	16
1962	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	9
1963	2	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	3	0	0	1	3	14
1964	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	8
1965	5	0	1	3	0	1	1	4	0	1	1	9	0	26
1966	8	0	4	0	0	4	14	4	8	1	0	6	2	51
1967	28	1	9	1	5	12	17	19	16	11	18	38	17	192
1968	22	2	5	2	1	6	10	8	13	6	6	20	7	108
1969	6	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	3	3	0	0	3	20
1970	22	0	5	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	3	0	1	38
1971	28	3	9	11	2	0	4	4	0	0	2	8	3	74
1972	16	0	4	2	0	0	1	1	4	1	0	0	1	30
1973	22	1	2	2	1	0	0	3	0	1	2	1	2	37
Total	181	8	49	23	12	29	65	54	59	28	44	98	53	703

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security	07 - Propaganda & Education
02 - Artillery, Engineers, 2d Arty (missiles)	08 - Industry & Communications
03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear	09 - Finance & Trade
04 - Air Force	10 - Foreign Affairs
05 - Navy	11 - Agriculture & Forestry
06 - General Political Department	12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 17

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPECTED DEMOTIONS BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a													TOT
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	6
1958	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	13
1959	7	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	3	1	19
1960	7	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	20
1961	4	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	10
1962	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
1963	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	8
1964	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
1965	8	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	1	3	1	20
1966	17	1	3	1	0	2	3	4	3	2	2	5	2	45
1967	71	4	12	4	3	8	9	15	12	9	8	19	11	185
1968	50	2	8	3	1	3	4	7	5	4	2	8	5	102
1969	10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	13
1970	15	0	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	5	2	2	30
1971	29	1	5	2	1	1	3	4	1	1	10	5	4	67
1972	11	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	4	1	2	22
1973	14	0	2	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	5	2	3	30
Total	258	8	39	11	5	15	32	47	30	20	38	59	33	595

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security	07 - Propaganda & Education
02 - Artillery, Engineers, 2d Arty (missiles)	08 - Industry & Communications
03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear	09 - Finance & Trade
04 - Air Force	10 - Foreign Affairs
05 - Navy	11 - Agriculture & Forestry
06 - General Political Department	12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 18

DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM EXPECTED DEMOTION DISTRIBUTION
BY FUNCTION, 1956-1973

Year	F u n c t i o n ^a													TOT
	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	UNK	
1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1957	-1	0	0	0	0	0	4	-1	-1	0	0	0	4	5
1958	-4	0	-1	0	0	0	1	2	2	-1	5	3	-1	6
1959	2	0	-1	0	0	0	2	0	-1	-1	3	0	2	6
1960	-2	0	1	0	1	0	-2	-2	3	1	1	0	4	5
1961	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
1962	-1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	-1	2	6
1963	-2	0	0	0	2	2	0	-1	2	0	0	0	3	6
1964	-1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	6
1965	-3	0	0	3	0	1	-1	2	-1	0	0	6	-1	6
1966	-9	-1	1	-1	0	2	11	0	5	-1	-2	1	0	6
1967	-43	-3	-3	-3	2	4	8	4	4	2	10	19	6	7
1968	-28	0	-3	-1	0	3	6	1	8	2	4	12	2	6
1969	-4	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	3	0	-1	3	7
1970	7	0	3	-1	0	2	1	0	0	1	-2	-2	-1	8
1971	-1	2	4	9	1	-1	1	0	-1	-1	-8	3	-1	7
1972	5	0	3	2	0	0	0	-1	4	1	-4	-1	-1	8
1973	8	1	0	2	1	-1	-1	1	0	1	-3	-1	-1	7
Total	-77	0	10	12	7	14	33	7	29	8	6	39	20	108

^aKey to boxhead numbers:

01 - Armor, Infantry, Public Security	07 - Propaganda & Education
02 - Artillery, Engineers, 2d Arty (missiles)	08 - Industry & Communications
03 - Signals, Railways, General Staff, & Rear	09 - Finance & Trade
04 - Air Force	10 - Foreign Affairs
05 - Navy	11 - Agriculture & Forestry
06 - General Political Department	12 - Political & Personnel

Appendix 19

MAJOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS USED IN THIS STUDY*

1. Data editing and error detection

The program is used to check (a) duplication of records, (b) numerical validation and ranges, (c) missing data, and (d) logical consistency. The program is designed to print identification numbers and errors with appropriate error messages when errors are detected.

2. Updating data and correcting errors

The function is to input additional data and corrections into the data file.

3. Sorting and merging

The function is to sort data in sequential ascending or descending order and to merge multiple files into one.

4. Deriving and generating new variables

The program is designed to derive and compute the following new variables from the raw data: promotion/demotion, insider/outsider, Korean War participants, new appointments, office holders, multiple position holders, and new parameters by year from 1956 to 1973. Then, the program will generate a work file containing the new variables and their data.

5. Computing and generating table outputs of the observed (actual), expected (impartial), and difference (deviation) matrices of personnel mobility

The program is designed to produce (using the 18-year time span) seven major parameters from the work file. The parameters are: generation field-army affiliation, commissar/commander, civilian/military, military-region affiliation, function, and insider/outsider. Then the program generates tables for the distribution of leaders, promotions, demotions, and positions of the above seven parameters by observed, expected, and difference matrices.

6. Assigning career type on the basis of personnel actions

The function is to establish six mutually exclusive career types by three periods (the eighteen years from 1956 to 1973, the ten years from 1956 to 1965, and the eight years from 1966 to 1973 from the raw data file and the work file. The six career types based on personnel actions are: multiple promotion, single promotion, multiple demotion, single demotion, mixed promotion and demotion, and neither promotion nor demotion.

* These Fortran programs (with the exception of 11 and 12) were written specifically for this study by Kenneth Yang of Systems Concept, Inc., for use on an IBM 370.

7. Detecting "cosmetic" personnel (holders of positions without power) and printing their background data
8. Excluding "cosmetic" personnel, printing office-holder matrix for selected years (1956, 1959, 1963, 1966, 1969, and 1973) for six major parameters (generations, field-army affiliation, commissar/commander, civilian/military, military-region affiliation, and function based on "final estimate" of their affiliation (see Tables 5 through 8, and Table 10)
9. Analyzing career patterns and background output for the six mutually exclusive career types

The function is to print numbers of promotions and demotions, changes of position, date of changes, changes of locations, and other biographical data regarding generation, civilian or military, commissar or commander, field-army affiliation, and function. The analysis is conducted in two periods: 1956 to 1965 and 1966 to 1973.
10. Analyzing geographic and position mobility for the six mutually exclusive career types (see Tables 12 through 17)
11. General frequency-distribution program
12. General cross-tabulation program

Appendix 20
BIOGRAPHIC SOURCES

1. *Appearances and Activities of Leading Chinese Communist Military Personalities*, November 1971, DIA, IR 6842 0027 72, January 24, 1972.
2. *China News Summary*, Hong Kong.
3. *Chinese Communist Military, Party and Government Personalities*, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1965.
4. *Chinese Communist Party Provincial Leaders*, Department of State, A71-31, Washington, D.C., November 1971.
5. *Directory of Chinese Communist Officials*, Department of State, A66-8, Washington, D.C., 1966.
6. *Directory of Chinese Communist Officials*, Department of State, A71-14, Washington, D.C., May 1971.
7. *Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China*, Central Intelligence Agency, A72-21, Washington, D.C., August 1972.
8. *Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China*, Central Intelligence Agency, A72-35, Washington, D.C., January 1974.
9. *Directory of Party and Government Officials of Communist China*, Department of State, BD 271, Washington, D.C., July 1960.
10. Huang Chen-hsia, *Mao's Generals*, Research Institute of Contemporary History, Hong Kong, 1968.
11. *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking.
12. Kao Chung-yen, *Changes of Personnel in Communist China (1959-1969)*, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1970.
13. Ting Wang, *Chung-kung Wen-ke Yun-tung chung te Tsu-chih yll Jen-shih Wen-t'i, 1965-1970* (Organizational and Personnel Problems During the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution, 1965-1970), Contemporary China Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1970.
14. *Who's Who in Communist China*, Vols. 1 & 2, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1969/70.
15. *1967 Chung Kung Nien Pao* (1967 Yearbook on Chinese Communism), Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, Taipeh, 1967.

16. *1970 Chung Kung Nien Pao* (1970 Yearbook on Chinese Communism),
Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, Taipeh,
1970.
17. *1971 Chung Kung Nien Pao* (1971 Yearbook of Chinese Communism),
Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, Taipeh,
1971.
18. *1957 Jen-min shou-ch'e* (1957 People's Handbook), Ta Kung Pao,
Peking, April 1957.

Appendix 21
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Books

- Armstrong, John, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus*, Praeger, New York, 1959.
- Barnett, A. Doak, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, with a contribution by Ezra Vogel, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967.
- , *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974.
- Beck, Carl, et al., *Comparative Communist Political Leadership*, McKay, New York, 1973.
- Chi Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928*, to be published by Stanford University Press, 1975.
- China News Analysis*, "The Post-Lin Piao Period," Nos. 870-873, 876, February-April 1972.
- Deutsch, Karl W., *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control*, Free Press, 1966.
- Gittings, John, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1967.
- Halperin, Morton H., *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974.
- Huntington, Samuel P., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 1962.
- Janowitz, Morris, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964.
- Johnson, John J. (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962.
- Lasswell, Harold D., and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965.
- Lewis, John W. (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1970.

Pye, Lucian, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychological Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.

Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1972.

Schurman, Franz, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.

Solomon, Richard H., *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971.

Vogel, Ezra, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969.

Whitson, William W., *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, The Rand Corporation, R-1091-DOS/ARPA, June 1973.

-----, *The Chinese High Command, 1927-71: A History of Communist Military Politics*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973.

----- (ed.), *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972.

II. Articles and Monographs

Baum, Richard, "Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: The Lesson of the 'Tang-ch'üan P'ai' in the Cultural Revolution," Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1972.

Bennett, Gordon A., "Elite and Society in China: A Summary of Research and Interpretation," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

-----, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, No. 54, 1973.

Blackwell, Robert E., Jr., "The Relationship Between Social Background Characteristics, Career Specialization, Political Attitudes, and Political Behavior Among Soviet Elites: A Research Design," a paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Bobrow, Davis B., "The Chinese Communist Conflict System," *ORBIS*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1966.

Bridgham, Philip, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origin and Development," *The China Quarterly*, No. 29, 1967.

-----, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," *The China Quarterly*, No. 34, 1968.

Chang, Parris H., "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival during the Cultural Revolution," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

-----, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," *The China Quarterly*, No. 44, 1970.

Chu Wen-lin, "An Analysis of the 29 New CCP Committees at the Provincial Level," *Issues and Studies*, November 1971.

Deutsch, Karl W., "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1, March 1960.

Domes, Jürgen, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees 1967-68," *The China Quarterly*, No. 44, 1970.

-----, "Some Results of the Cultural Revolution in China," *Asian Survey*, September 1971.

Dorrill, William F., *Power, Policy, and Ideology in the Making of China's 'Cultural Revolution'*, The Rand Corporation, RM-5731-PR, August 1968.

Dreyer, June, "Traditional Minorities Elites and the CPR Elite Engaged in Minority Nationalities Work," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

Edinger, Lewis J., "Political Science and Political Biography, Reflections on the Study of Leadership," *The Journal of Politics*, I, May 1964, and II, August 1964.

Edinger, Lewis J., and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2, June 1967.

Falkenheim, Victor C., "The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien," *Asian Survey*, August 1969.

-----, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949-66," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

Fang Chun-kuei, "An Analysis of the Current Status of Chinese Communist Party and Government Organs," *Issues and Studies*, January 1970.

Feurtado, Gardel, "The Formation of Provincial Revolutionary Committees, 1966-1968: Heilungkiang and Hopei," *Asian Survey*, December 1972.

- Gittings, John, "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution," John W. Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1970.
- Greenblatt, Sidney L., "Organizational Elites and Social Change at Peking University," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.
- Halperin, Morton H., "Chinese Attitudes Towards the Use and Control of Nuclear Weapons," Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), *China in Crisis*, Vol. II, University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Harding, Harry, Jr., "China: Toward Revolutionary Pragmatism," *Asian Survey*, January 1971.
- , "China: The Fragmentation of Power," *Asian Survey*, January 1972.
- Harding, Harry, Jr., and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning*, The Rand Corporation, R-548-PR, February 1971.
- Hinton, Harold C., *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking Under Soviet Pressure*, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California, 1971.
- Joffe, Ellis, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964*, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1965.
- Johnson, Chalmers, "China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective," *Asian Survey*, January 1968.
- Kao Ying-mao, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-65," A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Washington University Press, Seattle and London, 1969.
- Klein, Donald W., "The 'Next' Generation of Chinese Communist Leaders," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12, 1962.
- , "Sources for Elite Studies and Biographical Materials on China," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.
- , "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution," John W. Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*.
- Klein, Donald W., and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45, 1971.
- Montaperto, Ronald N., "From Revolutionary Successors to Revolutionaries: Chinese Students in the Early Stages of the Cultural Revolution," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

- Nathan, Andrew J., "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 53, January-March 1973.
- Nelsen, Harvey, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, No. 51, 1972.
- Neuhauser, Charles, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Machine," *Asian Survey*, June 1968.
- Nordinger, Eric A., "Soldiers in Mufti," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, December 1970.
- Oksenberg, Michel, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1968.
- , "Paths to Leadership in Communist China," *Current Scene*, August 1, 1965.
- Oksenberg, Michel, and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1974.
- Parish, William L., "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 56, 1973.
- Pollack, Jonathan D., "The Study of Chinese Military Politics: Towards a Framework for Analysis," Catherine M. Kelleher (ed.), *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1974.
- , "Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, 1964-1969," *The China Quarterly*, No. 50, April-June 1972.
- Powell, Ralph L., "The Party, the Government and the Gun," *Asian Survey*, June 1970.
- Powell, Ralph L., and Chong-Kun Yoan, "Public Security and the PLA," *Asian Survey*, December 1972.
- Robinson, Thomas W., "China in 1972: Socio-Economic Progress Amidst Political Uncertainty," *Asian Survey*, January 1973.
- , "Political Succession in China," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, October 1974.
- , "Lin Piao as an Elite Type," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.
- Russett, Bruce M., "Political Perspectives of U.S. Military and Business Elites," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1974.

Scalapino, Robert A., "The Transition in Chinese Party Leadership: A Comparison of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

Schram, Stuart R., "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, 1939-1969," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 4, April 1972.

Teiwes, Frederick C., "The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1957-1958," *The China Quarterly*, No. 27, 1966.

-----, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China 1956-1966*, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, 1967.

-----, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," John M. H. Lindbeck (ed.), *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1971.

White, Lynn T. III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

-----, "Shanghai's Policy in Cultural Revolution," John W. Lewis (ed.), *The City in Communist China*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1971.

Whitson, William W., "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 37, 1969.

-----, "Organizational Perspectives and Decisionmaking in the Chinese Communist High Command," Scalapino (ed.), *Elites in the People's Republic of China*.

Zagoria, Donald S., "The Strategic Debate in Peking," Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), *China in Crisis*, Vol. II, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968.

Sung

A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO CHINESE POLITICAL ANALYSIS

R-1665-ARPA